The DOI matches its Crossref record; 3 of the 3 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
What the Seller Won't Tell You: Persuasion and Disclosure in Markets
Abstract
Imagine that you are considering an investment in a new public offering of a firm's shares. The firm's officers make a presentation that includes an audited financial statement, an earnings forecast reviewed by its prestigious investment bankers, and an impressive demonstration of its new technology. Or suppose that you are buying a new furnace to replace an old one that is not working well. The salesman displays a chart showing that the projected total life-cycle cost of one particular model, including capital costs and fuel usage over the projected lifetime of the furnace, is lower than that of some competing models you have considered. This paper reviews the theoretical arguments about how sellers disclose information in an attempt to encourage buyers, and the potential role for regulation in encouraging efficient disclosure of information. How well does a system of private reporting work? When should we expect all the relevant information to be reported? If testing and reporting by the seller are costly, will too little testing and reporting be done? Or too much? When some information is withheld, what sort of information is withheld? How do rational buyers respond to such withholding? How are prices and welfare affected? What role is there for laws and regulations to improve the functioning of markets? We address these questions by studying the theory of persuasion games—games in which one or more sellers provide verifiable information to buyers to influence the actions they take.
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Citations
Cites
Strategic information transmission
Crawford, V. P., & Sobel, J. (1982) · Econometrica · doi:10.2307/1913390 · Cited by 4,293
Verrecchia, R. E. (1983) · Journal of Accounting and Economics · doi:10.1016/0165-4101(83)90011-3 · Cited by 3,481
Good News and Bad News: Representation Theorems and Applications
Milgrom, P. R. (1981) · The Bell Journal of Economics · doi:10.2307/3003562 · Cited by 3,123
Self-citation
Cited by
Optimal Information Disclosure
Rayo, L., & Segal, I. (2010) · Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1086/657922 · Cited by 484
Disclosure: Psychology Changes Everything
Loewenstein, G., Sunstein, C. R., & Golman, R. (2014) · Annual Review of Economics · doi:10.1146/annurev-economics-080213-041341 · Cited by 280
Household Debt: Facts, Puzzles, Theories, and Policies
Zinman, J. (2015) · Annual Review of Economics · doi:10.1146/annurev-economics-080614-115640 · Cited by 165
OECD (2010) · doi:10.1787/9789264079663-en · Cited by 54
Price of Transparency in Strategic Machine Learning
Akyol, E., Langbort, C., & Basar, T. (2016) · arXiv · doi:10.48550/arxiv.1610.08210 · Cited by 11
Metadata
- Authors
- Milgrom, P.
- Venue
- Journal of Economic Perspectives
- Publisher
- American Economic Association
- Published
- 2008-03-01
- Volume
- 22
- Issue
- 2
- Pages
- 115-131
- ISSN
- 0895-3309 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W1967599153
- Cited by
- 190
- References
- 3
- FWCI
- 10.25
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
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