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The DOI matches its Crossref record; 31 of the 32 references it cites were found in a registry or an index; none of the 36 sources its claims cite is checked for support yet.

Welfare Analysis Meets Causal Inference

Open access
Finkelstein, Amy, Hendren, Nathaniel · 2020 · Journal of Economic Perspectives

Abstract

We describe a frame work for empirical welfare analysis that uses the causal estimates of a policy’s impact on net government spending. This framework provides guidance for which causal effects are (and are not) needed for empirical welfare analysis of public policies. The key ingredient is the construction of each policy’s marginal value of public funds (MVPF). The MVPF is the ratio of beneficiaries’ willingness to pay for the policy to the net cost to the government. We discuss how the MVPF relates to “traditional” welfare analysis tools such as the marginal excess burden and marginal cost of public funds. We show how the MVPF can be used in practice by applying it to several canonical empirical applications from public finance, labor, development, trade, and industrial organization.

Overview

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TL;DR

The paper explains the marginal value of public funds (MVPF) as a transparent framework for combining causal estimates of policy effects with welfare analysis, defined as beneficiaries’ willingness to pay divided by net government cost. It argues the MVPF is useful after the credibility revolution because it shows which causal effects matter for welfare—mainly fiscal externalities—and illustrates the approach across tax, education, development, trade, and procurement examples.

Key findings

  • In the benchmark cash-transfer case, the MVPF is \(1/(1+FE)\), where \(FE\) is the fiscal externality per dollar of mechanical expenditure; under small, privately optimal responses, causal effects are needed for costs, not benefits.
  • For the 1993 tax increase on top earners, Hendren and Sprung-Keyser (2020) estimate a fiscal externality of −$0.46 per $1 of revenue, net cost of $0.54, and MVPF of 1.85; the Reagan 1981 tax cut had an estimated fiscal externality of −1.51, implying it “paid for itself.”
  • For the EITC, the estimated fiscal externality reduces net government costs by .08 per $1 mechanical increase, implying an MVPF of 1.12.
  • Tariff applications: Amiti, Redding, and Weinstein (2019a) estimate $15.6 billion revenue, $32 billion mechanical cost, and −$16.4 billion fiscal externality, giving MVPF 2.05 for a “small” tariff and 1.5 for a large tariff; Fajgelbaum et al. (2020) estimate $41.6 billion willingness to pay and $34.3 billion net revenue, implying MVPF 1.2. Education and de-worming examples have negative net government cost, implying infinite MVPF; a Medicare Advantage subsidy example yields MVPF roughly 1.

Methods

  • Conceptual/teaching essay, not an original empirical study; it defines the MVPF, derives formulas for cash and in-kind transfers, external effects, large policy changes, and non-privately-optimal behavior.
  • Uses existing causal estimates and applications from public finance, education, development, trade, and industrial organization, including Hendren and Sprung-Keyser (2020), Jackson, Johnson, and Persico (2016), Baird et al. (2016), Fajgelbaum et al. (2020), Amiti, Redding, and Weinstein (2019a), and Cabral, Geruso, and Mahoney (2018).
  • Main analysis is algebraic and illustrative, comparing the MVPF to traditional marginal-cost-of-public-funds and marginal-excess-burden approaches.

Limitations

  • The paper states that estimating willingness to pay can be challenging, especially for in-kind transfers or policies affecting individuals beyond direct recipients; large policy changes require estimating marginal recipients’ demand curve; and if behavior is not privately optimal, behavioral welfare analysis is needed.
  • The paper states the MVPF approach is “no panacea,” that welfare analysis of real-world policy will rarely be clear-cut, and that the framework does not break new theoretical ground—its mathematical formulation dates back to Mayshar (1990).
  • Evident from the text: the paper provides no original empirical estimates; its illustrative calculations depend on assumptions and external studies, and distributional/social-welfare-weight judgments remain normative rather than resolved by the MVPF.

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Integrity signals

Registry

Crossref · 10.1257/jep.34.4.146

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Citations

Cites

Research works printed but not linked: 26

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  2. Public Economics, Vol. 3, edited by Alan J. Auerbach and Martin Feldstein, 1347-1421. Amsterdam:
  3. Elsevier. Baird, Sarah, Joan Hamory Hicks, Michael Kremer, and Edward Miguel. 2016. "Worms at work: Long
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  5. Increasing Disability Insurance Benefit Generosity." Journal of Public Economics 88 (12): 2487-2514. Cabral, Marika, Michael Geruso, and Neale Mahoney. 2018. "Do Larger Health Insurance Subsidies
  6. Private Insurance." American Economic Journal: Economic Policy 2 (2): 85-114. Currie, Janet, and Firouz Gahvari. 2008. "Transfers in Cash and In-Kind: Theory Meets the Data." Journal
  7. of Economic Literature 46 (2): 333-83. Currie, Janet, and Jonathan Gruber. 1996. "Saving Babies: The Efficacy and Cost of Recent Changes in
  8. the Medicaid Eligibility of Pregnant Women." Journal of Political Economy 104 (6): 1263-96. Curto, Vilsa, Liran Einav, Jonathan Levin, and Jay Bhattacharya. 2014. "Can Health Insurance Competi
  9. American Economic Review 105 (4): 1547-80. Fajgelbaum, Pablo D., Pinelopi K. Goldberg, Patrick J. Kennedy, and Amit K. Khandelwal. 2020. "The
  10. and Statistics 81 (4): 674-80. Finkelstein, Amy. 2019. "Welfare Analysis Meets Causal Inference: A Suggested Interpretation of
  11. on Mortality and Out of Pocket Spending." Journal of Public Economics 92 (7): 1644-68. Finkelstein, Amy, Nathaniel Hendren, and Erzo F.P. Luttmer. 2019. "The Value of Medicaid: Interpreting
  12. Brookings Papers on Economic Activity 1999 (2):1-64. Greenstone, Michael. 2017. "The Continuing Impact of Sherwin Rosen's `Hedonic Prices and Implicit
  13. Harberger Arnold C, 1964, American Economic Review, 54, 58
  14. of Economics 131 (1): 157-218. Jäger, Simon, Benjamin Schoefer, and Josef Zweimüller. 2019. "Marginal Jobs and Job Surplus: A Test of
  15. 2020). Kleven, Henrik Jacobsen. Forthcoming. "Sufficient Statistics Revisited." Annual Review of Economics. Kleven, Henrik Jacobsen, and Claus Thustrup Kreiner. 2005. "Labor Supply Behavior and the Design of
  16. Tax and Transfer Policy." Danish Journal of Economics 143: 321-58. Kleven, Henrik Jacobsen, and Claus Thustrup Kreiner. 2006. "The Marginal Cost of Public Funds: Hours
  17. of Work versus Labor Force Participation." Journal of Public Economics 90 (10-11):1955-73. Kline, Patrick, and Christopher R. Walters. 2016. "Evaluating Public Programs with Close Substitutes:
  18. The Case of Head Start." Quarterly Journal of Economics 131 (4): 1795-1848. Krueger, Alan B., and Ilyana Kuziemko. 2013. "The Demand for Health Insurance among Uninsured
  19. Americans: Results of a Survey Experiment and Implications for Policy." Journal of Health Economics 32 (5): 780-93. Laffont, Jean-Jacques, and Jean Tirole. 1993. A Theory of Incentives in Procurement and Regulation.
  20. Procurement." The Review of Economic Studies (81) 3: 1201-28. Mayshar, Joram. 1990. "On Measures of Excess Burden and Their Applications." Journal of Public
  21. Economics 43 (3): 263-89. Medicare Payment Commission (MedPAC). 2018. Report to Congress: Medicare Payment Policy. Washington
  22. Journal of Political Economy 115 (2): 200-49. Plimpton. 1800 BC. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pythagorean_theorem#History. Poterba, James. 1996. "Government Intervention in the Markets for Education and Health care: How
  23. tion." Journal of Political Economy 82 (1): 34-55. Saez, Emmanuel. 2004. "Reported Incomes and Marginal Tax Rates, 1960-2000: Evidence and Policy
  24. New Evidence and Interpretation." Annual Review of Economics 8: 547-81. Slemrod, Joel, and Shlomo Yitzhaki. 1996. "The Costs of Taxation and the Marginal Efficiency Cost of
  25. Funds." International Monetary Fund Staff Papers 43 (1):172-98. Slemrod, Joel, and Shlomo Yitzhaki. 2001. "Integrating Expenditure and Tax Decisions: The Marginal
  26. Cost of Funds and the Marginal Benefit of Projects." National Tax Journal 54 (2): 189-202.

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Metadata

Authors
Finkelstein, A., & Hendren, N.
Affiliations
  • Massachusetts Institute of Technology (US)
  • Harvard University (US)
Venue
Journal of Economic Perspectives
Published
2020-11-01
Volume
34
Issue
4
Pages
146-167
ISSN
0895-3309 (ISSN-L)
OpenAlex
W3047877081
Cited by
141
References
32
Citations by year
2026: 20 · 2025: 28 · 2024: 31 · 2023: 21 · 2022: 24 · 2021: 13 · 2020: 2
FWCI
11.88
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
Locations
  • The Journal of Economic Perspectives (publishedVersion)
  • DSpace@MIT (Massachusetts Institute of Technology) (submittedVersion, cc-by-nc)
  • RePEc: Research Papers in Economics (submittedVersion)
Topics
  • Social Sciences › Economics, Econometrics and Finance › Economics and Econometrics › Economic and Fiscal Studies
  • Physical Sciences › Mathematics › Statistics and Probability › Advanced Causal Inference Techniques
  • Social Sciences › Economics, Econometrics and Finance › Economics and Econometrics › Fiscal Policy and Economic Growth
Keywords
marginal value of public funds, willingness to pay, marginal cost of public funds, public finance, labor policy, development policy, trade policy, industrial organization

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