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Welfare Analysis Meets Causal Inference
Open accessAbstract
We describe a frame work for empirical welfare analysis that uses the causal estimates of a policy’s impact on net government spending. This framework provides guidance for which causal effects are (and are not) needed for empirical welfare analysis of public policies. The key ingredient is the construction of each policy’s marginal value of public funds (MVPF). The MVPF is the ratio of beneficiaries’ willingness to pay for the policy to the net cost to the government. We discuss how the MVPF relates to “traditional” welfare analysis tools such as the marginal excess burden and marginal cost of public funds. We show how the MVPF can be used in practice by applying it to several canonical empirical applications from public finance, labor, development, trade, and industrial organization.
Overview
CoChat Summary
TL;DR
The paper explains the marginal value of public funds (MVPF) as a transparent framework for combining causal estimates of policy effects with welfare analysis, defined as beneficiaries’ willingness to pay divided by net government cost. It argues the MVPF is useful after the credibility revolution because it shows which causal effects matter for welfare—mainly fiscal externalities—and illustrates the approach across tax, education, development, trade, and procurement examples.
Key findings
- In the benchmark cash-transfer case, the MVPF is \(1/(1+FE)\), where \(FE\) is the fiscal externality per dollar of mechanical expenditure; under small, privately optimal responses, causal effects are needed for costs, not benefits.
- For the 1993 tax increase on top earners, Hendren and Sprung-Keyser (2020) estimate a fiscal externality of −$0.46 per $1 of revenue, net cost of $0.54, and MVPF of 1.85; the Reagan 1981 tax cut had an estimated fiscal externality of −1.51, implying it “paid for itself.”
- For the EITC, the estimated fiscal externality reduces net government costs by .08 per $1 mechanical increase, implying an MVPF of 1.12.
- Tariff applications: Amiti, Redding, and Weinstein (2019a) estimate $15.6 billion revenue, $32 billion mechanical cost, and −$16.4 billion fiscal externality, giving MVPF 2.05 for a “small” tariff and 1.5 for a large tariff; Fajgelbaum et al. (2020) estimate $41.6 billion willingness to pay and $34.3 billion net revenue, implying MVPF 1.2. Education and de-worming examples have negative net government cost, implying infinite MVPF; a Medicare Advantage subsidy example yields MVPF roughly 1.
Methods
- Conceptual/teaching essay, not an original empirical study; it defines the MVPF, derives formulas for cash and in-kind transfers, external effects, large policy changes, and non-privately-optimal behavior.
- Uses existing causal estimates and applications from public finance, education, development, trade, and industrial organization, including Hendren and Sprung-Keyser (2020), Jackson, Johnson, and Persico (2016), Baird et al. (2016), Fajgelbaum et al. (2020), Amiti, Redding, and Weinstein (2019a), and Cabral, Geruso, and Mahoney (2018).
- Main analysis is algebraic and illustrative, comparing the MVPF to traditional marginal-cost-of-public-funds and marginal-excess-burden approaches.
Limitations
- The paper states that estimating willingness to pay can be challenging, especially for in-kind transfers or policies affecting individuals beyond direct recipients; large policy changes require estimating marginal recipients’ demand curve; and if behavior is not privately optimal, behavioral welfare analysis is needed.
- The paper states the MVPF approach is “no panacea,” that welfare analysis of real-world policy will rarely be clear-cut, and that the framework does not break new theoretical ground—its mathematical formulation dates back to Mayshar (1990).
- Evident from the text: the paper provides no original empirical estimates; its illustrative calculations depend on assumptions and external studies, and distributional/social-welfare-weight judgments remain normative rather than resolved by the MVPF.
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0 Valid · 5 Not valid · 32 Not checked · 74 Own results and interpretations
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In the paper
“Given these assumptions, the $1 increase in the cash transfer has no welfare effect on marginal beneficiaries (in other words, those who change their behavior in response to the policy change in order to become newly eligible).”
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- Rests on 2 assumptions not shown here.
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In the paper
“However, a large literature in behavioral economics suggests that individuals commonly make mistakes.”
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In the paper
“This means that one can construct a budget-neutral policy that increases individuals' welfare by spending more on the policy with the high MVPF, with such policy financed by reduced spending on the policy with the low MVPF.”
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In the paper
“For some taxes, such as carbon taxes, the marginal cost of public funds is potentially negative because taxing carbon can have large benefits in the long run that offset its costs today.”
hedgedstates a possible cause- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
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In the paper
“However, many policies have indirect effects beyond the obvious beneficiaries.”
plainstates a cause- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
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Rated minor: it would not touch a result — a value no result rests on, a p-value that stays on the same side of the significance level, or a conflict that is clerical, resolved elsewhere in the paper, or outside its own findings.
In the paper
§ Income Tax Rates
“a $1 mechanical increase in the EITC leads to a fiscal externality that reduces net government costs by .08.This implies an MVPF of $1.12 (= 1/(1 -.08)).”
§ Putting it Together
“MVPF $1 = 1 ________ (1 + FE)”
Citations
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Metadata
- Authors
- Finkelstein, A., & Hendren, N.
- Affiliations
- Massachusetts Institute of Technology (US)
- Harvard University (US)
- Venue
- Journal of Economic Perspectives
- Publisher
- American Economic Association
- Published
- 2020-11-01
- Volume
- 34
- Issue
- 4
- Pages
- 146-167
- ISSN
- 0895-3309 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W3047877081
- Cited by
- 141
- References
- 32
- Citations by year
- 2026: 20 · 2025: 28 · 2024: 31 · 2023: 21 · 2022: 24 · 2021: 13 · 2020: 2
- FWCI
- 11.88
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- diamond
- doi.org
- Locations
- The Journal of Economic Perspectives (publishedVersion)
- DSpace@MIT (Massachusetts Institute of Technology) (submittedVersion, cc-by-nc)
- RePEc: Research Papers in Economics (submittedVersion)
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Economics, Econometrics and Finance › Economics and Econometrics › Economic and Fiscal Studies
- Physical Sciences › Mathematics › Statistics and Probability › Advanced Causal Inference Techniques
- Social Sciences › Economics, Econometrics and Finance › Economics and Econometrics › Fiscal Policy and Economic Growth
- Keywords
- marginal value of public funds, willingness to pay, marginal cost of public funds, public finance, labor policy, development policy, trade policy, industrial organization
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