The DOI matches its Crossref record; 2 of the 2 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Contractual and Organizational Structure with Reciprocal Agents
Open accessAbstract
We solve for the optimal contract when agents are reciprocal, demonstrating that generous compensation can substitute for performance-based pay. Our results suggest several factors that make firms more likely to use reciprocal incentives. Reciprocity is most powerful when output is a poor signal of effort and when the agent is highly reciprocal and/or productive. Similarly, reciprocal incentives are attractive when firm managers have strong incentive pay and discretion over employee compensation. While reciprocal incentives can be optimal even when identical firms compete, a reciprocity contract is most likely when one firm has a match-specific productivity advantage with the agent. (JEL D23, D86, J33, M12, M52)
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Cites
The Provision of Incentives in Firms
Prendergast, C. (1999) · Journal of Economic Literature · doi:10.1257/jel.37.1.7 · Cited by 3,338
Reciprocity and incentive pay in the workplace
Dur, R., Non, A., & Roelfsema, H. (2010) · Journal of Economic Psychology · doi:10.1016/j.joep.2010.05.001 · Cited by 50
Cited by
Kőszegi, B. (2014) · Journal of Economic Literature · doi:10.1257/jel.52.4.1075 · Cited by 317
Scarring or Scaring? The Psychological Impact of Past Unemployment and Future Unemployment Risk
KNABE, A., & RÄTZEL, S. (2011) · Economica · doi:10.1111/j.1468-0335.2009.00816.x · Cited by 288
Nonmonetary Incentives and the Implications of Work as a Source of Meaning
Cassar, L., & Meier, S. (2018) · Journal of Economic Perspectives · doi:10.1257/jep.32.3.215 · Cited by 288
Reciprocity and incentive pay in the workplace
Dur, R., Non, A., & Roelfsema, H. (2010) · Journal of Economic Psychology · doi:10.1016/j.joep.2010.05.001 · Cited by 50
Metadata
- Authors
- Englmaier, F., & Leider, S.
- Venue
- American Economic Journal: Microeconomics
- Publisher
- American Economic Association
- Published
- 2012-05-01
- Volume
- 4
- Issue
- 2
- Pages
- 146-183
- ISSN
- 1945-7669 (ISSN-L)
- 1945-7685
- OpenAlex
- W2168957176
- Cited by
- 158
- References
- 2
- FWCI
- 24.55
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
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