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Cited by 158

The DOI matches its Crossref record; 2 of the 2 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.

Contractual and Organizational Structure with Reciprocal Agents

Open access
Englmaier, Florian, Leider, Stephen·2012·American Economic Journal: Microeconomics

Abstract

We solve for the optimal contract when agents are reciprocal, demonstrating that generous compensation can substitute for performance-based pay. Our results suggest several factors that make firms more likely to use reciprocal incentives. Reciprocity is most powerful when output is a poor signal of effort and when the agent is highly reciprocal and/or productive. Similarly, reciprocal incentives are attractive when firm managers have strong incentive pay and discretion over employee compensation. While reciprocal incentives can be optimal even when identical firms compete, a reciprocity contract is most likely when one firm has a match-specific productivity advantage with the agent. (JEL D23, D86, J33, M12, M52)

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Metadata

Authors
Englmaier, F., & Leider, S.
Venue
American Economic Journal: Microeconomics
Published
2012-05-01
Volume
4
Issue
2
Pages
146-183
ISSN
  • 1945-7669 (ISSN-L)
  • 1945-7685
OpenAlex
W2168957176
Cited by
158
References
2
FWCI
24.55
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
green

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CoChat. (2026). Citation check: Contractual and Organizational Structure with Reciprocal Agents. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.1257/mic.4.2.146
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Englmaier, F., & Leider, S. (2012). Contractual and Organizational Structure with Reciprocal Agents. American Economic Journal: Microeconomics. https://doi.org/10.1257/mic.4.2.146

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Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.

Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).

Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.