Transfer Program Complexity and the Take-Up of Social Benefits
Abstract
We model complexity in social programs as a by-product of the screening process. While a more rigorous screening process may improve targeting efficiency, the associated complexity is costly to applicants and induces incomplete take-up. We integrate the study of take-up with the study of rejection (Type I) and award (Type II) errors, and characterize optimal programs when policy makers choose screening intensity (and complexity), an eligibility rule, and a benefit level. Consistent with many real-world programs, optimal programs feature high complexity, incomplete take-up, classification errors of both Type I and II and, in some cases, “excessive” benefits. (JEL D04, D82, H23, I18, I38)
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An ordeal associated with receiving a program can improve screening between rich and poor.
“This idea-that having an”
From Universal Basic Incomes versus Targeted Transfers: Anti-Poverty Programs in Developing Countries (2018) · cites this paper as Kleven and Kopczuk (2011)
A key result is that one may offer a transfer to all takers but impose a sign-up cost that is differentially costly for the rich.
“A key result is that one may want to offer a transfer program to all takers, but with the catch that signing up for the program entails a cost that is differentially costly for the rich.”
From Universal Basic Incomes versus Targeted Transfers: Anti-Poverty Programs in Developing Countries (2018) · cites this paper as Kleven and Kopczuk (2011)
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Individual choice behavior: A theoretical analysis.
Luce, R. D. (2005) · doi:10.1037/14396-000 · Cited by 1,157 · see citing works
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Universal Basic Incomes versus Targeted Transfers: Anti-Poverty Programs in Developing Countries
Hanna, R., & Olken, B. A. (2018) · Journal of Economic Perspectives · doi:10.1257/jep.32.4.201 · Cited by 299 · see citing works
- Authors
- Kleven, H. J., & Kopczuk, W.
- Affiliations
- Centre for Economic Policy Research (GB)
- Center for Economic and Policy Research (US)
- ORCID
- Kopczuk, Wojciech
- Venue
- American Economic Journal: Economic Policy
- Publisher
- American Economic Association
- Published
- 2011-02-01
- Volume
- 3
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- 54-90
- ISSN
- 1945-7731 (ISSN-L)
- 1945-774X
- OpenAlex
- W1975668613
- Cited by
- 199
- References
- 1
- Citations by year
- 2026: 14 · 2025: 6 · 2024: 36 · 2023: 22 · 2022: 26 · 2021: 15 · 2020: 6 · 2019: 10 · 2018: 11 · 2017: 5 · 2016: 14 · 2015: 15 · 2014: 4 · 2013: 7 · 2012: 2
- FWCI
- 12.21
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
- Locations
- American Economic Journal Economic Policy (publishedVersion)
- RePEc: Research Papers in Economics (submittedVersion)
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Safety Research › Poverty, Education, and Child Welfare
- Social Sciences › Political Science and International Relations › Social Policy and Reform Studies
- Social Sciences › Gender Studies › Gender, Labor, and Family Dynamics
- Keywords
- software complexity, applicant screening, targeting efficiency, type I error, type II error, screening intensity, eligibility rules, benefit levels
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