Manipulation of Social Program Eligibility
Open accessAbstract
We document how manipulation of a targeting system for social welfare programs evolves over time. First, there was strategic behavior of some local politicians in the timing of the household interviews around local elections. Then, there was corrupt behavior with the sudden emergence of a sharp discontinuity in the score density, exactly at the eligibility threshold, which coincided with the release of the score algorithm to local officials. The discontinuity at the threshold is larger where mayoral elections are more competitive. While cultural forces are surely relevant for corruption, our results also highlight the importance of information and incentives. (JEL D72, I32, I38, O15, O17).
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In Colombia, as the proxy-means formula became known, reporting bunched substantially just below the eligibility cutoff.
“Using data from Colombia, Camacho and Conover (2011) show that over time as the formula became known, there was substantial bunching of reporting right below the eligibility cutoff.”
From Universal Basic Incomes versus Targeted Transfers: Anti-Poverty Programs in Developing Countries (2018) · cites this paper as Camacho and Conover (2011)
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- Besley, Timothy, and Robin Burgess. 2002. "The Political Economy Of Government Responsiveness: Theory And Evidence From India." Quarterly Journal of Economics, 117(4): 1415-1451.
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The central role of the propensity score in observational studies for causal effects
ROSENBAUM, P. R., & RUBIN, D. B. (1983) · Biometrika · doi:10.1093/biomet/70.1.41 · Cited by 31,241 · see citing works
Universal Basic Incomes versus Targeted Transfers: Anti-Poverty Programs in Developing Countries
Hanna, R., & Olken, B. A. (2018) · Journal of Economic Perspectives · doi:10.1257/jep.32.4.201 · Cited by 299 · see citing works
Bucheli, J. F. (2015) · Análisis Político · doi:10.15446/anpol.v28n83.51641 · Cited by 5 · see citing works
- Authors
- Camacho, A., & Conover, E.
- Affiliations
- Universidad de Los Andes (CO)
- Hamilton College (US)
- ORCID
- Camacho, Adriana
- Venue
- American Economic Journal: Economic Policy
- Publisher
- American Economic Association
- Published
- 2011-05-01
- Volume
- 3
- Issue
- 2
- Pages
- 41-65
- ISSN
- 1945-7731 (ISSN-L)
- 1945-774X
- OpenAlex
- W2007438186
- Cited by
- 144
- References
- 0
- Citations by year
- 2026: 3 · 2025: 5 · 2024: 17 · 2023: 4 · 2022: 13 · 2021: 13 · 2020: 10 · 2019: 6 · 2018: 13 · 2017: 6 · 2016: 8 · 2015: 14 · 2014: 4 · 2013: 14 · 2012: 9
- FWCI
- 23.06
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
- www.openicpsr.org
- Locations
- American Economic Journal Economic Policy (publishedVersion)
- RePEc: Research Papers in Economics (submittedVersion)
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Safety Research › Poverty, Education, and Child Welfare
- Social Sciences › Sociology and Political Science › Corruption and Economic Development
- Social Sciences › Sociology and Political Science › Income, Poverty, and Inequality
- Keywords
- social program targeting, eligibility thresholds, corruption, strategic behavior, local elections, mayoral elections, political incentives
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