The Value of Intrusion Detection Systems in Information Technology Security Architecture
The DOI matches its Crossref record; 1 of the 1 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
The increasing significance of information technology (IT) security to firms is evident from their growing IT security budgets. Firms rely on security technologies such as firewalls and intrusion detection systems (IDSs) to manage IT security risks. Although the literature on the technical aspects of IT security is proliferating, a debate exists in the IT security community about the value of these technologies. In this paper, we seek to assess the value of IDSs in a firm’s IT security architecture. We find that the IDS configuration, represented by detection (true positive) and false alarm (false positive) rates, determines whether a firm realizes a positive or negative value from the IDS. Specifically, we show that a firm realizes a positive value from an IDS only when the detection rate is higher than a critical value, which is determined by the hacker’s benefit and cost parameters. When the firm realizes a positive (negative) value, the IDS deters (sustains) hackers. However, irrespective of whether the firm realizes a positive or negative value from the IDS, the IDS enables the firm to better target its investigation of users, while keeping the detection rate the same. Our results suggest that the positive value of an IDS results not from improved detection per se, but from an increased deterrence enabled by improved detection. Finally, we show that the firm realizes a strictly nonnegative value if the firm configures the IDS optimally based on the hacking environment.
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Citations
Cites
Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach
Becker, G. S. (1968) · Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1086/259394 · Cited by 13,999
Cited by
Information security and privacy in healthcare: current state of research
Appari, A., & Johnson, M. E. (2010) · International Journal of Internet and Enterprise Management · doi:10.1504/ijiem.2010.035624 · Cited by 406
Choice and Chance: A Conceptual Model of Paths to Information Security Compromise
Ransbotham, S., & Mitra, S. (2009) · Information Systems Research · doi:10.1287/isre.1080.0174 · Cited by 246
“First, security technology is often error-prone, generating many false positives and false negatives (Cavusoglu et al. 2005).”
BackgroundSecurity of interdependent and identical networked control systems
Amin, S., Schwartz, G. A., & Shankar Sastry, S. (2013) · Automatica · doi:10.1016/j.automatica.2012.09.007 · Cited by 237
Decision-Theoretic and Game-Theoretic Approaches to IT Security Investment
Cavusoglu, H., Raghunathan, S., & Yue, W. T. (2008) · Journal of Management Information Systems · doi:10.2753/mis0742-1222250211 · Cited by 233
“security mechanisms (such as IDS and firewall) [8, 10, 11].”
BackgroundSelf-citationShaikh, F. A., & Siponen, M. (2023) · Computers & Security · doi:10.1016/j.cose.2022.102974 · Cited by 135
Metadata
- Authors
- Cavusoglu, H., Mishra, B., & Raghunathan, S.
- Venue
- Information Systems Research
- Published
- 2005-03
- Volume
- 16
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- 28-46
- ISSN
- 1047-7047 (ISSN-L)
- 1526-5536
- OpenAlex
- W2096830520
- Cited by
- 231
- References
- 1
- FWCI
- 37.72
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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