Research Note—Quality Uncertainty and the Performance of Online Sponsored Search Markets: An Empirical Investigation
The DOI matches its Crossref record; 3 of the 3 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
Online sponsored search advertising has emerged as the dominant online advertising format largely because of their pay-for-performance nature, wherein advertising expenditures are closely tied to outcomes. While the pay-for-performance format substantially reduces the wastage incurred by advertisers compared to traditional pay-per-exposure advertising formats, the reduction of such wastage also carries the risk of reducing the signaling properties of advertising. Lacking a separating equilibrium, low-quality firms in these markets may be able to mimic the advertising strategies of high-quality firms. This study examines this issue in the context of online sponsored search markets. Using data gathered from sponsored search auctions for keywords in a market without intervention by the intermediary, we find evidence of adverse selection for products/services characterized by high uncertainty. On the other hand, there is no evidence of adverse selection for similar products in a regulated sponsored search market, suggesting that intervention by the search intermediary can have a significant impact on market outcomes and consumer welfare.
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Cites
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The value of reputation on eBay: A controlled experiment
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Cited by
An Empirical Analysis of Search Engine Advertising: Sponsored Search in Electronic Markets
Ghose, A., & Yang, S. (2009) · Management Science · doi:10.1287/mnsc.1090.1054 · Cited by 681
Social Media and Firm Equity Value
Luo, X., Zhang, J., & Duan, W. (2013) · Information Systems Research · doi:10.1287/isre.1120.0462 · Cited by 627
Product fit uncertainty in online markets: nature, effects, and antecedents
Hong, Y. (., & Pavlou, P. A. (2014) · Information Systems Research · doi:10.1287/isre.2014.0520 · Cited by 453
Yang, S., & Ghose, A. (2010) · Marketing Science · doi:10.1287/mksc.1090.0552 · Cited by 374
Promotional Marketing or Word-of-Mouth? Evidence from Online Restaurant Reviews
Lu, X., Ba, S., Huang, L., & Feng, Y. (2013) · Information Systems Research · doi:10.1287/isre.1120.0454 · Cited by 301
Metadata
- Authors
- Animesh, A., Ramachandran, V., & Viswanathan, S.
- Venue
- Information Systems Research
- Published
- 2010-03
- Volume
- 21
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- 190-201
- ISSN
- 1047-7047 (ISSN-L)
- 1526-5536
- OpenAlex
- W2002362689
- Cited by
- 97
- References
- 3
- FWCI
- 11.28
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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- Animesh, A., Ramachandran, V., & Viswanathan, S. (2010). Research Note—Quality Uncertainty and the Performance of Online Sponsored Search Markets: An Empirical Investigation. Information Systems Research. https://doi.org/10.1287/isre.1080.0222
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