The DOI matches its Crossref record; 2 of the 2 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Voluntary Quality Disclosure and Market Interaction
Open accessAbstract
Marketers disclose quality information directly to potential consumers using a variety of communication channels. This study investigates how competition may influence duopoly firms' incentive to voluntarily reveal quality information. We show that firms in competitive markets reveal less information than a monopoly firm. In addition, sequential disclosure leads to asymmetric equilibrium disclosure behavior: the disclosure leader reveals unambiguously less information than in the simultaneous disclosure case, whereas the follower ex ante reveals less (more) private information than that released by the leader or by the firms in the simultaneous case when the disclosure cost is sufficiently low (high). We also examine the equilibrium firm profits and social welfare. We demonstrate that there may be a U-shaped relationship between equilibrium monopoly profits (or social welfare under both monopoly and duopoly) and the disclosure cost. Moreover, in comparison to the simultaneous disclosure case, sequential disclosure can lead to increasingly softened competition, improving both firm profitability and social welfare.
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Cites
The Market for "Lemons": Quality Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism
Akerlof, G. A. (1970) · The Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.2307/1879431 · Cited by 23,016
Good News and Bad News: Representation Theorems and Applications
Milgrom, P. R. (1981) · The Bell Journal of Economics · doi:10.2307/3003562 · Cited by 3,123
Cited by
Quality Disclosure and Certification: Theory and Practice
Dranove, D., & Jin, G. Z. (2010) · Journal of Economic Literature · doi:10.1257/jel.48.4.935 · Cited by 740
Do I Follow My Friends or the Crowd? Information Cascades in Online Movie Ratings
Lee, Y.-J., Hosanagar, K., & Tan, Y. (2015) · Management Science · doi:10.1287/mnsc.2014.2082 · Cited by 377
The Sound of Silence: Observational Learning in the U.S. Kidney Market
Zhang, J. (2010) · Marketing Science · doi:10.1287/mksc.1090.0500 · Cited by 267
Metadata
- Authors
- Guo, L., & Zhao, Y.
- Venue
- Marketing Science
- Published
- 2009-05
- Volume
- 28
- Issue
- 3
- Pages
- 488-501
- ISSN
- 0732-2399 (ISSN-L)
- 1526-548X
- OpenAlex
- W2095875236
- Cited by
- 206
- References
- 2
- FWCI
- 7.61
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
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