On the Value of Commitment and Availability Guarantees When Selling to Strategic Consumers
Open accessThe DOI matches its Crossref record; 35 of the 35 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
This paper studies the role of product availability in attracting consumer demand. We start with a newsvendor model, but additionally assume that stockouts are costly to consumers. The seller sets an observable price and an unobservable stocking quantity. Consumers anticipate the likelihood of stockouts and determine whether to visit the seller. We characterize the rational expectations equilibrium in this game. We propose two strategies that the seller can use to improve profits: (i) commitment (i.e., the seller, ex ante, commits to a particular quantity) and (ii) availability guarantees (i.e., the seller promises to compensate consumers, ex post, if the product is out of stock). Interestingly, the seller has an incentive to overcompensate consumers during stockouts, relative to the first-best benchmark under which social welfare is maximized. We find that first-best outcomes do not arise in equilibrium, but can be supported when the seller uses a combination of commitment and availability guarantees. Finally, we examine the robustness of these conclusions by extending our analysis to incorporate dynamic learning, multiple products, and consumer heterogeneity.
Overview
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Free: it reads the open-access text and checks the first 5 claims that cite a source we can check. Create a free account to check every claim.
Integrity signals
Registry
Cites
Statistics
Verification
Claims the paper makes
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Free: it reads the open-access text and checks the first 5 claims that cite a source we can check. Create a free account to check every claim.
Self-check
Percentages, sums and reported differences re-computed from the paper’s own numbers.
The self-check needs the paper’s full text.
Citations
Cites
Rational Expectations and the Theory of Price Movements
Muth, J. F. (1961) · Econometrica · doi:10.2307/1909635 · Cited by 5,594
Price and Advertising Signals of Product Quality
Milgrom, P., & Roberts, J. (1986) · Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1086/261408 · Cited by 2,271
Coase, R. H. (1972) · The Journal of Law and Economics · doi:10.1086/466731 · Cited by 1,571
To Queue or Not to Queue: Equilibrium Behavior in Queueing Systems
Hassin, R., & Haviv, M. (2003) · International Series in Operations Research & Management Science · doi:10.1007/978-1-4615-0359-0 · Cited by 1,045
Bulow, J. I. (1982) · Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1086/261058 · Cited by 886
Optimal Pricing of Seasonal Products in the Presence of Forward-Looking Consumers
Aviv, Y., & Pazgal, A. (2008) · Manufacturing & Service Operations Management · doi:10.1287/msom.1070.0183 · Cited by 686
Rational Expectations and Durable Goods Pricing
Stokey, N. L. (1981) · The Bell Journal of Economics · doi:10.2307/3003511 · Cited by 616
Intertemporal Pricing with Strategic Customer Behavior
Su, X. (2007) · Management Science · doi:10.1287/mnsc.1060.0667 · Cited by 613
Self-citationPurchasing, Pricing, and Quick Response in the Presence of Strategic Consumers
Cachon, G. P., & Swinney, R. (2009) · Management Science · doi:10.1287/mnsc.1080.0948 · Cited by 610
Intertemporal Price Discrimination
Stokey, N. L. (1979) · The Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.2307/1883163 · Cited by 589
Cited by
Gallino, S., & Moreno, A. (2014) · Management Science · doi:10.1287/mnsc.2014.1951 · Cited by 711
Omnichannel Retail Operations with Buy-Online-and-Pick-up-in-Store
Gao, F., & Su, X. (2017) · Management Science · doi:10.1287/mnsc.2016.2473 · Cited by 690
Self-citationThe Value of Fast Fashion: Quick Response, Enhanced Design, and Strategic Consumer Behavior
Cachon, G. P., & Swinney, R. (2011) · Management Science · doi:10.1287/mnsc.1100.1303 · Cited by 687
Purchasing, Pricing, and Quick Response in the Presence of Strategic Consumers
Cachon, G. P., & Swinney, R. (2009) · Management Science · doi:10.1287/mnsc.1080.0948 · Cited by 610
Online and Offline Information for Omnichannel Retailing
Gao, F., & Su, X. (2017) · Manufacturing & Service Operations Management · doi:10.1287/msom.2016.0593 · Cited by 469
Self-citationConsumer Returns Policies and Supply Chain Performance
Su, X. (2009) · Manufacturing & Service Operations Management · doi:10.1287/msom.1080.0240 · Cited by 460
Self-citationOptimal Multiperiod Pricing with Service Guarantees
Borgs, C., Candogan, O., Chayes, J., Lobel, I., & Nazerzadeh, H. (2014) · Management Science · doi:10.1287/mnsc.2013.1839 · Cited by 60
“The firm provides service guarantees to its customers, so it must set prices that ensure that the demand D̄t4p5 does not violate the capacity ct at capture the problem of the firm selecting prices for its next business day.”
BackgroundDesigning multi-channel technologies – the mediating role of risk perceptions
Ortlinghaus, A., & Zielke, S. (2019) · The International Review of Retail, Distribution and Consumer Research · doi:10.1080/09593969.2019.1664610 · Cited by 8
“This risk dimension is closely related to time risk, as the customer may have to invest time to visit alternative stores to check if the desired product is available elsewhere if the selected store does not have it in stock (Bendoly et al. 2005; Su and Zhang 2009).”
BackgroundInfluential
Metadata
- Authors
- Su, X., & Zhang, F.
- Venue
- Management Science
- Published
- 2009-05
- Volume
- 55
- Issue
- 5
- Pages
- 713-726
- ISSN
- 0025-1909 (ISSN-L)
- 1526-5501
- OpenAlex
- W3125447491
- Cited by
- 265
- References
- 35
- FWCI
- 21.25
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
About these checks
Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.
Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.
Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.
What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›
Are you an author, or do you see a problem with this page? Request a review
Data sources
Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.