Cleaning House: The Impact of Information Technology Monitoring on Employee Theft and Productivity
Abstract
This paper examines how firm investments in technology-based employee monitoring impact both misconduct and productivity. We use unique and detailed theft and sales data from 392 restaurant locations from five firms that adopt a theft monitoring information technology (IT) product. We use difference-in-differences models with staggered adoption dates to estimate the treatment effect of IT monitoring on theft and productivity. We find significant treatment effects in reduced theft and improved productivity that appear to be primarily driven by changed worker behavior rather than worker turnover. We examine four mechanisms that may drive this productivity result: economic and cognitive multitasking, fairness-based motivation, and perceived increases of general oversight. The observed productivity results represent substantial financial benefits to both firms and the legitimate tip-based earnings of workers. Our results suggest that employee misconduct is not solely a function of individual differences in ethics or morality, but can also be influenced by managerial policies that can benefit both firms and employees. This paper was accepted by Serguei Netessine, operations management.
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Cites
How Much Should We Trust Differences-in-Differences Estimates?
Bertrand, M., Duflo, E., & Mullainathan, S. (2004) · The Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.1162/003355304772839588 · Cited by 10,641 · see citing works
Bharadwaj, A. S. (2000) · MIS Quarterly · doi:10.2307/3250983 · Cited by 5,042 · see citing works
Why employees do bad things: Moral disengagement and unethical organizational behavior
MOORE, C., DETERT, J. R., KLEBE TREVIÑO, L., BAKER, V. L., & MAYER, D. M. (2012) · Personnel Psychology · doi:10.1111/j.1744-6570.2011.01237.x · Cited by 1,159 · see citing works
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Potential Employees' Ethical Perceptions of Active Monitoring: The Dark Side of Data Analytics
Holt, M., Lang, B., & Sutton, S. G. (2017) · Journal of Information Systems · doi:10.2308/isys-51580 · Cited by 44 · see citing works
Ban Targeted Advertising? An Empirical Investigation of the Consequences for App Development
Kircher, T., & Foerderer, J. (2024) · Management Science · doi:10.1287/mnsc.2023.4726 · Cited by 36 · see citing works
- Authors
- Pierce, L., Snow, D. C., & McAfee, A.
- Affiliations
- Washington University in St. Louis (US)
- Brigham Young University (US)
- Massachusetts Institute of Technology (US)
- ORCID
- Pierce, Lamar
- Venue
- Management Science
- Published
- 2015-10
- Volume
- 61
- Issue
- 10
- Pages
- 2299-2319
- ISSN
- 0025-1909 (ISSN-L)
- 1526-5501
- OpenAlex
- W1919376000
- Cited by
- 251
- References
- 3
- Citations by year
- 2026: 14 · 2025: 32 · 2024: 28 · 2023: 24 · 2022: 15 · 2021: 37 · 2020: 31 · 2019: 26 · 2018: 14 · 2017: 14 · 2016: 10 · 2015: 6
- FWCI
- 38.08
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
- Locations
- Management Science (publishedVersion)
- ScholarsArchive (Brigham Young University) (submittedVersion)
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Demography › Cyberloafing and Workplace Behavior
- Social Sciences › Decision Sciences › Information Systems and Management › Ethics in Business and Education
- Social Sciences › Business, Management and Accounting › Management Information Systems › Accounting and Organizational Management
- Keywords
- employee monitoring, information technology, employee theft, labor productivity, employee behavior, multitasking, management policy
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