The DOI matches its Crossref record; 6 of the 6 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Asymmetric Information, Incentives and Intrafirm Resource Allocation
Abstract
This paper considers the question: How should a firm allocate a resource among divisions when the productivity of the resource in each division is known only to the division manager? Obviously if the divisions (as represented by their managers) are indifferent among various allocations of the resource, the headquarters can simply request the division managers to reveal their private information on productivity knowing that the managers have no incentive to lie. The resource allocation problem can then be solved under complete (or at least symmetric) information. This aspect is a flaw in much of the recent literature on this topic, i.e., there is nothing in the models considered which makes divisions prefer one allocation over another. Thus, although in some cases elaborate allocation schemes are proposed and analyzed, they are really unnecessary. In the model we develop, a division can produce the same output with less managerial effort if it is allocated more resources, and effort is costly to the manager. We further assume that this effort is unobservable by the headquarters, so that it cannot infer divisional productivity from data on divisional output and managerial effort. Given these assumptions, we seek an optimal resource allocation process. Our results show that certain types of transfer pricing schemes are optimal. In particular, if there are no potentially binding capacity constraints on production of the resource, then an optimal process is for each division to choose a transfer price from a schedule announced by the headquarters. Division managers receive a fixed compensation minus the cost of the resource allocated to them at the chosen transfer price. Resources are allocated on the basis of the chosen transfer prices. If there is a potentially binding constraint on resource production, a somewhat more complicated, but similar, scheme is required.
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Citations
Cites
Incentive Compatibility and the Bargaining Problem
Myerson, R. B. (1979) · Econometrica · doi:10.2307/1912346 · Cited by 1,983
Resource Allocation Under Asymmetric Information
Harris, M., & Townsend, R. M. (1981) · Econometrica · doi:10.2307/1911125 · Cited by 434
Self-citationAllocation Mechanisms and the Design of Auctions
Harris, M., & Raviv, A. (1981) · Econometrica · doi:10.2307/1911413 · Cited by 309
Self-citationThe New Soviet Incentive Model
Weitzman, M. L. (1976) · The Bell Journal of Economics · doi:10.2307/3003200 · Cited by 275
A Theory of Monopoly Pricing Schemes with Demand Uncertainty
Harris, M., & Raviv, A. (1981) · American Economic Review · Cited by 221
Self-citationIncentives in a Divisionalized Firm
Groves, T., & Loeb, M. P. (1979) · Management Science · doi:10.1287/mnsc.25.3.221 · Cited by 176
Cited by
Diversification's effect on firm value
Berger, P. G., & Ofek, E. (1995) · Journal of Financial Economics · doi:10.1016/0304-405x(94)00798-6 · Cited by 3,061
Agency, Information and Corporate Investment
Stein, J. C. (2003) · Handbook of the Economics of Finance · doi:10.1016/s1574-0102(03)01006-9 · Cited by 1,347
Explaining the Diversification Discount
Campa, J. M., & Kedia, S. (2002) · The Journal of Finance · doi:10.1111/1540-6261.00476 · Cited by 1,345
Agency Problems, Equity Ownership, and Corporate Diversification
DENIS, D. J., DENIS, D. K., & SARIN, A. (1997) · The Journal of Finance · doi:10.1111/j.1540-6261.1997.tb03811.x · Cited by 1,304
INTERNATIONAL DIVERSIFICATION AND FIRM PERFORMANCE: THE S-CURVE HYPOTHESIS.
Lu, J. W., & Beamish, P. W. (2004) · Academy of Management Journal · doi:10.2307/20159604 · Cited by 1,282
Metadata
- Authors
- Harris, M., Kriebel, C. H., & Raviv, A.
- Venue
- Management Science
- Published
- 1982-06
- Volume
- 28
- Issue
- 6
- Pages
- 604-620
- ISSN
- 0025-1909 (ISSN-L)
- 1526-5501
- OpenAlex
- W1974669536
- Cited by
- 478
- References
- 6
- FWCI
- 5.57
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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