The DOI matches its Crossref record; 5 of the 5 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Performance Feedback and Firm Risk Taking: The Moderating Effects of CEO and Outside Director Stock Options
Abstract
We contribute to the behavioral theory of the firm and the behavioral agency model by developing a theoretical framework that predicts the differential interaction effects of performance feedback and values of stock option grants of multiple agents on firm risk taking. We explain how chief executive officers (CEOs) versus outside directors awarded with stock option grants perceive negative or positive deviations from prior performance. We argue that in a negative attainment discrepancy context, high values of option grants will increase the risk aversion of CEOs who already bear excessive employment and compensation risks, resulting in less risk taking; however, it will enhance the risk-taking propensity of influential outside directors who increase monitoring and support for risky projects because their risk preferences are better aligned with those of shareholders. In a positive attainment discrepancy context, high values of option grants will amplify risk aversion in both CEOs and outside directors who perceive risky strategies as potential threats to anticipated incentive values associated with a gain domain, thereby reducing risk-taking activities. Analysis of panel data from 1992 to 2006 on the research and development spending of U.S. manufacturing firms based on Arellano–Bond dynamic panel regression reveals findings largely consistent with our predictions.
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Cites
Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision under Risk
Kahneman, D., & Tversky, A. (1979) · Econometrica · doi:10.2307/1914185 · Cited by 48,524
The pricing of options and corporate liabilities
Black, F., & Scholes, M. (1973) · Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1086/260062 · Cited by 29,074
Agency Theory: An Assessment and Review
Eisenhardt, K. M. (1989) · The Academy of Management Review · doi:10.5465/amr.1989.4279003 · Cited by 13,338 · cited 1×
“…risky activities, whereas risk-averse CEOs with much less opportunity to diversify their financial and human capital are hesitant to invest in risky projects because of the increased possibility of being fired and losing their monetary wealth (Coffee 1988, Eisenhardt 1989, Beatty and Zajac 1994).”
BackgroundA Simple Approximation of Tobin's q
Chung, K. H., & Pruitt, S. W. (1994) · Financial Management · doi:10.2307/3665623 · Cited by 2,460
Portfolio theory and capital markets
Breen, W. J., & Sharpe, W. F. (1972) · The Journal of Finance · doi:10.2307/2978700 · Cited by 1,221
Cited by
Renewing Research on Problemistic Search—A Review and Research Agenda
Posen, H. E., Keil, T., Kim, S., & Meissner, F. D. (2018) · Academy of Management Annals · doi:10.5465/annals.2016.0018 · Cited by 462
Managerial Risk Taking: A Multitheoretical Review and Future Research Agenda
Hoskisson, R. E., Chirico, F., Zyung, J. (., & Gambeta, E. (2017) · Journal of Management · doi:10.1177/0149206316671583 · Cited by 441
ESG performance and corporate risk-taking: Evidence from China
He, F., Ding, C., Yue, W., & Liu, G. (2023) · International Review of Financial Analysis · doi:10.1016/j.irfa.2023.102550 · Cited by 355
What is strategic leadership? Developing a framework for future research
Samimi, M., Cortes, A. F., Anderson, M. H., & Herrmann, P. (2022) · The Leadership Quarterly · doi:10.1016/j.leaqua.2019.101353 · Cited by 328
Metadata
- Authors
- Lim, E. N. K., & McCann, B. T.
- Venue
- Organization Science
- Published
- 2014-02
- Volume
- 25
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- 262-282
- ISSN
- 1047-7039 (ISSN-L)
- 1526-5455
- OpenAlex
- W2108206675
- Cited by
- 186
- References
- 5
- FWCI
- 18.23
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
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