Telling the story of theory of mind: Deaf and hearing children's narratives and mental state understanding
The DOI matches its Crossref record; 5 of the 5 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
Theory of mind (ToM) was examined in late‐signing deaf children in two studies by using standard tests and measures of spontaneous talk about inner states of perception, affect and cognition during storytelling. In Study 1, there were 21 deaf children aged 6 to 11 years and 13 typical‐hearing children matched with the deaf by chronological age. In Study 2, there were 17 deaf children aged 6 to 12 years and 17 typical‐hearing preschoolers aged 4 to 5 years who were matched with the deaf by ToM test performance. In addition to replicating the consistently reported finding of poor performance on standard false belief tests by late‐signing deaf children, significant correlations emerged in both studies between deaf children's ToM test scores and their spontaneous narrative talk about imaginative cognition (e.g. ‘pretend’). In Study 2, with a new set of purpose‐built pictures that evoked richer and more complex mentalistic narration than the published picture book of Study 1, results of multiple regression analyses showed that children's narrative talk about imaginative cognition was uniquely important, over and above hearing status and talking of other kinds of mental states, in predicting ToM scores. The same was true of children's elaborated narrative talk using utterances that either spelt out thoughts, explained inner states or introduced contrastives. In addition, results of a Guttman scalogram analysis in Study 2 suggested a consistent sequence in narrative and standard test performance by deaf and hearing children that went from (1) narrative mention of visible (affective or perceptual) mental states only, along with FB failure, to (2) narrative mention of cognitive states along with (1), to (3) elaborated narrative talk about inner states along with (2), and finally to (4) simple and elaborated narrative talk about affective/perceptual and cognitive states along with FB test success. Possible explanations for this performance ordering, as well as for the observed correlations in both studies between ToM test scores and narrative variables, were considered.
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Citations
Cites
Does the autistic child have a “theory of mind” ?
Baron-Cohen, S., Leslie, A. M., & Frith, U. (1985) · Cognition · doi:10.1016/0010-0277(85)90022-8 · Cited by 8,599 · cited 2×
“The FB task was a slightly modified version of Baron-Cohen et al.’s (1985) Sally-Ann task.”
BackgroundMethodMeta-Analysis of Theory-of-Mind Development: The Truth about False Belief
Wellman, H. M., Cross, D., & Watson, J. (2001) · Child Development · doi:10.1111/1467-8624.00304 · Cited by 4,476 · cited 6×
“A large body of research over the past two decades shows that most typically developing hearing children master FB tests as preschoolers ( Wellman, Cross, & Watson, 2001 ), whereas severe delays, often stretching through middle childhood or the teens, are frequently observed in children with autism (see Happe, 1995, f…”
BackgroundMethodResultInfluentialScaling of theory-of-mind tasks.
Wellman, H. M., & Liu, D. (2004) · Child Development · doi:10.1111/j.1467-8624.2004.00691.x · Cited by 1,980
The Role of Age and Verbal Ability in the Theory of Mind Task Performance of Subjects with Autism
Happe, F. G. E. (1995) · Child Development · doi:10.2307/1131954 · Cited by 1,227
The Relation between Children's and Mothers’ Mental State Language and Theory-of-Mind Understanding
Ruffman, T., Slade, L., & Crowe, E. (2002) · Child Development · doi:10.1111/1467-8624.00435 · Cited by 885 · cited 2×
“It is also probable that mature narrators may tailor their use of mentalistic speech to their intended audience (Peterson & Slaughter, 2003; Ruffman et al., 2002).”
Background
Cited by
The parent–infant dyad and the construction of the subjective self
Fonagy, P., Gergely, G., & Target, M. (2007) · Journal of Child Psychology and Psychiatry · doi:10.1111/j.1469-7610.2007.01727.x · Cited by 555
Conversation and theory of mind: Do children talk their way to socio‐cognitive understanding?
de Rosnay, M., & Hughes, C. (2006) · British Journal of Developmental Psychology · doi:10.1348/026151005x82901 · Cited by 257
Rosso, A. M., Viterbori, P., & Scopesi, A. M. (2015) · Frontiers in Psychology · doi:10.3389/fpsyg.2015.01134 · Cited by 49
Mentalizing abilities in preadolescents’ and their mothers’ autobiographical narratives.
Scopesi, A. M., Rosso, A. M., Viterbori, P., & Panchieri, E. (2015) · The Journal of Early Adolescence · doi:10.1177/0272431614535091 · Cited by 31
Metadata
- Authors
- Peterson, C. C., & Slaughter, V. P.
- Venue
- British Journal of Developmental Psychology
- Publisher
- Wiley
- Published
- 2006-03
- Volume
- 24
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- 151-179
- ISSN
- 0261-510X (ISSN-L)
- 2044-835X
- OpenAlex
- W2153093007
- Cited by
- 108
- References
- 5
- FWCI
- 5.60
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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