CoChat

Others, Other Minds, and Others' Theories of Other Minds: An Afterword on the Psychology and Politics of Opacity Claims

Keane, Webb · 2008 · Anthropological Quarterly
Cited by 83

The DOI matches its Crossref record; 2 of the 2 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.

Abstract

Others, Other Minds, and Others' Theories of Other Minds:An Afterword on the Psychology and Politics of Opacity Claims Webb Keane The remarkable coherence of this collection of papers may be due to their shared footing in Melanesia. But we should also take seriously Alan Rumsey's suggestion that we not think of these issues as being peculiarly Melanesian, and use them to help us think comparatively across cases. I want to offer some suggestions about how opacity claims, which can seem to be so specific to a certain ethnographic region, can help illuminate problems of mind and speech elsewhere. This means both entering into the specificity of the Melanesian examples to see what people might be up to when they talk this way, and drawing from our ethnographic insights those themes that turn up in all sorts of other places, including the Euro-American West. Certainly Melanesia is a locus classicus for opacity statements, which we might summarize as the claim that it is impossible to know what is in the mind of another person. But how "other" is the opacity claim, as we can call such statements about "other minds"? Perhaps both less and more than might at first seem to be the case. The opacity claim, that it is impossible to know what is in the mind of another person, has commonly been treated as an assertion about psychology. [End Page 473] But these papers make it very clear that it is perhaps not about psychology at all, or at least that it is also about a great deal more than that. Whatever else the opacity claim may be, it is surely a metalinguistic claim about the relations between public evidence and private states. More specifically, as both Alan Rumsey and Bambi Schieffelin point out, it is a metapragmatic claim. That is to say, it is a claim about acts of revealing and acts of concealing and how those are or are not to be taken as evidence for private states. And finally, as Rupert Stasch shows us, it can be a political claim. Returning now to the question of psychology, I would also like to argue that the opacity claim is part of a politics that is saturated with a moral psychology. I think Stasch's invocation of Richard Moran's (2001) work is very much to the point here. The opacity claim, at least in much of the Melanesian evidence we have before us in this collection, is among other things, a political claim about the moral and practical conditions of social interaction and about the power relations that those involve. It takes as one of its central concerns the question "what I am able to do with you, to do to you, and to keep from you?" Joel Robbins starts off by suggesting that Melanesia offers a test of the limits of variability. Can people really operate without the kind of theory of other minds that seems to go along with imputing intentionality as a way of talking about the meaning of other people's words? In a strong sense Robbins seems to be suggesting that the imputing of intentions to others is in fact peculiar to us, the Euro-Americans, that it's just one of those funny things that Westerners believe. Here we have an instance of a classic topos in the reading of the more exotic ethnographies, in which we are invited to conclude that they, the "Others," actually understand the way social life (or, say language, or power, and so forth) really is, and thus give the lie to our own delusions in the West. But in the final instance these papers do not undertake the kind of frontal assault on Western psychology that such an argument seems to call for. Robbins essentially proposes this position and then in the end pulls back from it. And I think none of the papers in fact does make a direct challenge to familiar Western psychological claims. Indeed, both Alan Rumsey and Bambi Schieffelin make clear they find it hard to disagree with the basic observation of developmental psychologists (e.g. Gopnik and Meltzoff 1997) that a child's ability to lie, to...

Overview

The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.

Free: it reads the open-access text and checks the first 5 claims that cite a source we can check. Create a free account to check every claim.

A few free checks a day · papers already verified open instantly · results are public

Integrity signals

Registry

Crossref · 10.1353/anq.0.0000

Cites

2 of 2 references verified0 citation errors · 0 not checkable

Statistics

Verification

Claims the paper makes

The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.

Free: it reads the open-access text and checks the first 5 claims that cite a source we can check. Create a free account to check every claim.

A few free checks a day · papers already verified open instantly · results are public

Self-check

Percentages, sums and reported differences re-computed from the paper’s own numbers.

The self-check needs the paper’s full text.

Citations

Cites

Cited by

See all 83

Metadata

Authors
Keane, W.
Venue
Anthropological Quarterly
Publisher
Project MUSE
Published
2008-03
Volume
81
Issue
2
Pages
473-482
ISSN
  • 0003-5491 (ISSN-L)
  • 1534-1518
OpenAlex
W1976828392
Cited by
83
References
2
FWCI
4.40
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
closed

About these checks

Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.

Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.

Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.

What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›

Are you an author, or do you see a problem with this page? Request a review

Data sources

Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.

Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).

Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.