When opportunity knocks, who answers? New evidence on college achievement awards
Open accessAbstract
We evaluate the effects of academic achievement awards for first and second-year college students on a Canadian commuter campus.The award scheme offered linear cash incentives for course grades above 70.Awards were paid every term.Program participants also had access to peer advising by upperclassmen.Program engagement appears to have been high but overall treatment effects were small.The intervention increased the number of courses graded above 70 and points earned above 70 for second-year students, but there was no significant effect on overall GPA.Results are somewhat stronger for a subsample that correctly described the program rules.We argue that these results fit in with an emerging picture of mostly modest effects for cash award programs of this type at the post-secondary level.
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Canadian STAR program effects were stronger among students who could more accurately describe program requirements.
“Angrist, Oreopoulos, and Williams (2014) found that the Canadian STAR program's effects were stronger among students who could more accurately describe program requirements.”
From College Costs, Financial Aid, and Student Decisions (2022) · cites this paper as Angrist, Oreopoulos, and Williams (2014)
The Summary and Conclusions report a stronger response among students who understood the award scheme, but this finding concerns Opportunity Knocks (OK), not STAR. Background and Research Design identifies STAR as an earlier, distinct program; the paper does not report this understanding-related finding for STAR. No page number is provided in our copy. (LLM, conf=0.88)
Experimental — accuracy not yet measuredThe Canadian STAR performance-based scholarship had only limited positive effects on academic outcomes.
“the Canadian STAR performance-based scholarship had only limited positive effects on academic outcomes (Angrist, Oreopoulos, and Williams, 2014).”
From College Costs, Financial Aid, and Student Decisions (2022) · cites this paper as Angrist, Oreopoulos, and Williams, 2014
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Cites
Identification and estimation of local average treatment effects
Imbens, G. W., & Angrist, J. D. (1994) · Econometrica · doi:10.2307/2951620 · Cited by 4,101 · see citing works
Self-citationAccounting for No-Shows in Experimental Evaluation Designs
Bloom, H. S. (1984) · Evaluation Review · doi:10.1177/0193841x8400800205 · Cited by 532 · see citing works
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Research works printed but not linked: 12
- Angrist, Joshua, Eric Bettinger, Erik Bloom, Elizabeth King, and Michael Kremer. 2002. "Vouchers for Private Schooling in Columbia: Evidence from a Randomized Natural Experiment." American Economic Review, 92: 1535-1558.
- Angrist, Joshua, Daniel Lang, and Philip Oreopoulos. 2009. "Incentives and Services for College Achievement: Evidence from a Randomized Trial." American Economic Journal: Applied Economics, 1(1): 136-63.
- Angrist, Joshua D., and Victor Lavy. 2009. "The Effect of High School Matriculation Awards: Evidence from a Randomized Trial." American Economic Review, 99(4): 1384-1414.
- Angrist, Joshua D., and Jörn-Steffen Pischke. 2009. Mostly Harmless Econometrics. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- Ashenfelter, Orley, and Mark W. Plant. 1990. "Nonparametric Estimates of the Labor-Supply Effects of Negative Income Tax Programs." Journal of Labor Economics, 8(1, Part 2: Essays in Honor of Albert Rees): S396-S415.
- Bettinger, Eric P., and Bridget Terry Long. 2009. "Addressing the Needs of Under-Prepared Students in Higher Education: Does College Remediation Work?" Journal of Human Resources, 44(3): 736-771.
- Deardon, Lorraine, Carl Emmerson, Christine Frayne, and Costas Meghir. 2009. "Conditional Cash Transfers and School Dropout Rates." Journal of Human Resources, 44(4): 827-857.
- Dynarski, Susan. 2004. "The New Merit Aid." In College Choices: The Economics of Where to Go, When to Go, and How to Pay for It, edited by Caroline M. Hoxby, 63-100. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press.
- Henry, Gary T., and Ross Rubinstein. 2002. "Paying for Grades: Impact of Merit-Based Financial Aid on Education Quality." Journal of Policy Analysis and Management, 21: 93-109.
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- Pallais, Amanda. 2009. "Taking a Chance on College: Is the Tennessee Education Lottery Scholarship Program a Winner?" The Journal of Human Resources, 44(1): 199-222.
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Financial aid policy: lessons from research
Dynarski, S., & Scott-Clayton, J. (2013) · The Future of children · doi:10.1353/foc.2013.0002 · Cited by 255 · see citing works
College Costs, Financial Aid, and Student Decisions
Dynarski, S., Page, L., & Scott-Clayton, J. (2022) · National Bureau of Economic Research · doi:10.3386/w30275 · Cited by 56 · see citing works
- Authors
- Angrist, J., Oreopoulos, P., & Williams, T.
- Affiliations
- University of Toronto (CA)
- ORCID
- Angrist, Joshua
- Venue
- Journal of Human Resources
- Publisher
- University of Wisconsin Press
- Published
- 2014
- Volume
- 49
- Issue
- 3
- Pages
- 572-610
- ISSN
- 0022-166X (ISSN-L)
- 1548-8004
- OpenAlex
- W2215668497
- Cited by
- 96
- References
- 2
- Citations by year
- 2026: 2 · 2025: 3 · 2024: 6 · 2023: 9 · 2022: 10 · 2021: 7 · 2020: 7 · 2019: 9 · 2018: 4 · 2017: 8 · 2016: 13 · 2015: 4 · 2014: 4 · 2013: 6 · 2012: 3
- FWCI
- 15.11
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- bronze
- doi.org
- Locations
- The Journal of Human Resources (publishedVersion)
- National Bureau of Economic Research (publishedVersion)
- RePEc: Research Papers in Economics (submittedVersion)
- Project Muse (Johns Hopkins University) (submittedVersion)
- DSpace@MIT (Massachusetts Institute of Technology) (submittedVersion, cc-by-nc-sa)
- Other univ. web domain
- Funders
- Spencer Foundation
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Education › Higher Education Research Studies
- Social Sciences › Education › School Choice and Performance
- Social Sciences › Safety Research › Poverty, Education, and Child Welfare
- Keywords
- cash incentives, university students, peer advising, grade point average, student engagement, incentive effectiveness, postsecondary education
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