The DOI matches its Crossref record; 16 of the 16 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Constitutional Design for Divided Societies
Abstract
Scholarly experts can be more helpful to democratic constitution-writers in ethnically divided countries by formulating specific recommendations than by overwhelming them with a barrage of options. Especially the following deserve the highest priority and should be the points of departure in constitutional negotiations: elections by proportional representation (specifically, closed-list proportional representation in not overly large districts), a parliamentary form of government, a cabinet in which power-sharing is prescribed in ethnic or partisan terms, a constructive vote of no confidence, a head of state elected by parliament or whose office is combined with the prime minister's, federalism and decentralization, a federal chamber that is less powerful than the lower house and in which the smaller states are only slightly over-represented, publicly funded autonomous schools for religious groups, and little or no use of the referendum.
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Cites
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Minorities at Risk: A Global View of Ethnopolitical Conflicts
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A Democratic South Africa?: Constitutional Engineering in a Divided Society
Horowitz, D. L. (1991) · doi:10.1525/9780520328884 · Cited by 689 · cited 1×
“Horowitz’s proposal to design various electoral mechanisms (especially the use of the “alternative vote” or “instant runoff”) that would encourage the election of moderate representatives.(6) It resembles Barry’s proposal in that it aims for moderation rather than broad representation in the legislature and the execut…”
BackgroundPresidential or parliamentary democracy: Does it make a difference?
Linz, J. J. (1994) · Dialnet (Universidad de la Rioja) · Cited by 647
Hipsher, P. L. (1997) · Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs · doi:10.2307/166517 · Cited by 385
Mixed-member electoral systems : the best of both worlds?
Shugart, M. S., & WATTENBERG, M. P. (2003) · Cited by 382
Democracy in Divided Societies: Electoral Engineering for Conflict Management
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Electoral laws and the survival of presidential democracies
(1997) · Electoral Studies · doi:10.1016/s0261-3794(97)83135-6 · Cited by 258
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The Place of Self‐Interest and the Role of Power in Deliberative Democracy*
Mansbridge, J., Bohman, J., Chambers, S., Estlund, D., Føllesdal, A., Fung, A., Lafont, C., Manin, B., & Martí, J. L. (2010) · Journal of Political Philosophy · doi:10.1111/j.1467-9760.2009.00344.x · Cited by 1,022
Economic versus Cultural Differences: Forms of Ethnic Diversity and Public Goods Provision
BALDWIN, K., & HUBER, J. D. (2010) · American Political Science Review · doi:10.1017/s0003055410000419 · Cited by 501
The Electoral Sweet Spot: Low‐Magnitude Proportional Electoral Systems
Carey, J. M., & Hix, S. (2011) · American Journal of Political Science · doi:10.1111/j.1540-5907.2010.00495.x · Cited by 442
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Metadata
- Authors
- Lijphart, A.
- Venue
- Journal of Democracy
- Publisher
- Project MUSE
- Published
- 2004-04
- Volume
- 15
- Issue
- 2
- Pages
- 96-109
- ISSN
- 1045-5736 (ISSN-L)
- 1086-3214
- OpenAlex
- W1968837954
- Cited by
- 762
- References
- 16
- FWCI
- 62.05
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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