Inflation Targeting under Asymmetric Preferences
Open accessThe DOI matches its Crossref record; 2 of the 2 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
The views expressed in this Working Paper are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily represent those ofthe IMF or IMF policy.Working Papers describe research in progress by the author(s) and are published to elicit conunents and to further debate. WP/01l161This paper develops and estimates a game-theoretical model of inflation targeting where the central banker's preferences are asymmetric around the targeted rate.Specifically, positive deviations from the target can be weighted more, or less, severely than negative ones in the central banker's loss function.It is shown that some of the previous results derived under the assumption of symmetry are not robust to this generalization of preferences.Estimates of the central banker's preference parameters for Canada, Sweden, and the United Kingdom are statistically different from the one implied by the commonly-used quadratic loss function.
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Cites
Engle, R. F. (1982) · Econometrica · doi:10.2307/1912773 · Cited by 20,795
Rules Rather than Discretion: The Inconsistency of Optimal Plans
Kydland, F. E., & Prescott, E. C. (1977) · Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1086/260580 · Cited by 7,905
Metadata
- Authors
- Ruge-Murcia, F. J.
- Venue
- Journal of Money, Credit, and Banking
- Publisher
- Project MUSE
- Published
- 2003
- Volume
- 35
- Issue
- 5
- Pages
- 763-785
- ISSN
- 0022-2879 (ISSN-L)
- 1538-4616
- OpenAlex
- W2097795999
- Cited by
- 162
- References
- 2
- FWCI
- 18.22
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- bronze
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- Ruge-Murcia, F. J. (2003). Inflation Targeting under Asymmetric Preferences. Journal of Money, Credit, and Banking. https://doi.org/10.1353/mcb.2003.0038
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