Cited by 123Philosophy and Theoretical ScienceMental Health and PsychiatryAutism Spectrum Disorder Research

Autistic Self-Awareness

McGeer, Victoria·2004·Philosophy, Psychiatry, & Psychology

Abstract

A currently popular view traces autistic cognitive abnormalities to a defective capacity for theorizing about other minds. Two prominent researchers, Uta Frith and Francesca Happ�, extend this account by tracing further autistic abnormalities to impaired self-consciousness. This paper argues that Frith and Happ�'s account requires a treatment of autistic self-report that is problematic on both methodological and philosophical grounds. However, the philosophical problems point to an alternative account of self-awareness and self-report in normal individuals; and this account gives us a methodologically more attractive approach to explaining autistic abnormalities.

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Crossref · 10.1353/ppp.2004.0066

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  • Consequently, researchers have often avoided attending to first-person testimony, preferring to privilege reports from parents, teachers or other informants, or laboratory-based observation over considering the perspectives of the person themselves.

    “Consequently, researchers have often avoided attending to first‐person testimony, preferring to privilege reports from parents, teachers or other informants, or laboratory‐based observation over considering the perspectives of the person themselves (Jaswal & Akhtar, 2018; Mazefsky, Kao, & Oswald, 2011; McGeer, 2004; Milton, 2012).”

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Authors
McGeer, V.
Corresponding author
McGeer, Victoria
Venue
Philosophy, Psychiatry, & Psychology
Publisher
Project MUSE
Published
2004-09
Volume
11
Issue
3
Pages
235-251
ISSN
  • 1071-6076 (ISSN-L)
  • 1086-3303
OpenAlex
W2010132419
Cited by
123
References
0
Citations by year
2026: 22 · 2025: 1 · 2024: 3 · 2023: 3 · 2022: 2 · 2021: 17 · 2020: 4 · 2019: 2 · 2018: 3 · 2017: 12 · 2016: 2 · 2015: 3 · 2014: 4 · 2013: 1 · 2012: 19
FWCI
1.42
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
closed
Locations
  • Philosophy, psychiatry & psychology (publishedVersion)
  • Project Muse (Johns Hopkins University) (submittedVersion)
Funders
  • James S. McDonnell Foundation
  • Australian National University
Topics
  • Social Sciences › Psychology › Experimental and Cognitive Psychology › Philosophy and Theoretical Science
  • Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Mental Health and Psychiatry
  • Life Sciences › Neuroscience › Cognitive Neuroscience › Autism Spectrum Disorder Research
Keywords
autism spectrum disorder, self-awareness, theory of mind, self-consciousness, first-person reports, philosophy of mind

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