Scientific discovery in a model-centric framework: Reproducibility, innovation, and epistemic diversity
Open accessThe DOI matches its Crossref record; 9 of the 9 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
Consistent confirmations obtained independently of each other lend credibility to a scientific result. We refer to results satisfying this consistency as reproducible and assume that reproducibility is a desirable property of scientific discovery. Yet seemingly science also progresses despite irreproducible results, indicating that the relationship between reproducibility and other desirable properties of scientific discovery is not well understood. These properties include early discovery of truth, persistence on truth once it is discovered, and time spent on truth in a long-term scientific inquiry. We build a mathematical model of scientific discovery that presents a viable framework to study its desirable properties including reproducibility. In this framework, we assume that scientists adopt a model-centric approach to discover the true model generating data in a stochastic process of scientific discovery. We analyze the properties of this process using Markov chain theory, Monte Carlo methods, and agent-based modeling. We show that the scientific process may not converge to truth even if scientific results are reproducible and that irreproducible results do not necessarily imply untrue results. The proportion of different research strategies represented in the scientific population, scientists' choice of methodology, the complexity of truth, and the strength of signal contribute to this counter-intuitive finding. Important insights include that innovative research speeds up the discovery of scientific truth by facilitating the exploration of model space and epistemic diversity optimizes across desirable properties of scientific discovery.
Overview
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Free: it reads the open-access text and checks the first 5 claims that cite a source we can check. Create a free account to check every claim.
Integrity signals
Registry
Cites
Statistics
Verification
Claims the paper makes
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Free: it reads the open-access text and checks the first 5 claims that cite a source we can check. Create a free account to check every claim.
Self-check
Percentages, sums and reported differences re-computed from the paper’s own numbers.
The self-check needs the paper’s full text.
Citations
Cites
Why Most Published Research Findings Are False
Ioannidis, J. P. A. (2005) · PLoS Medicine · doi:10.1371/journal.pmed.0020124 · Cited by 10,505
The Logic of Scientific Discovery
Popper, K. R., & Weiss, G. (1959) · Physics Today · doi:10.1063/1.3060577 · Cited by 2,717
Shall we Really do it Again? The Powerful Concept of Replication is Neglected in the Social Sciences
Schmidt, S. (2009) · Review of General Psychology · doi:10.1037/a0015108 · Cited by 1,125 · cited 1×
“Introduction If obtained independently of each other, multiple confirmations of a claim in a scientific inquiry lend credibility to that claim [1,2].”
BackgroundThe natural selection of bad science
Smaldino, P. E., & McElreath, R. (2016) · Royal Society Open Science · doi:10.1098/rsos.160384 · Cited by 860 · cited 2×
“Relatedly, Smaldino and McElreath [5] provided an evolutionary model of science to study how incentives drive scientific progress and they report that current incentive structures lead to the degradation of scientific practices.”
BackgroundGilbert, N. (2008) · doi:10.4135/9781412983259 · Cited by 692
Meta-research: Evaluation and Improvement of Research Methods and Practices
Ioannidis, J. P. A., Fanelli, D., Dunne, D. D., & Goodman, S. N. (2015) · PLOS Biology · doi:10.1371/journal.pbio.1002264 · Cited by 495 · cited 1×
“Our work contributes to meta-research [12] by introducing a theoretical framework in which we can observe the effects of parameters of the process of scientific discovery on a variety of indicators of scientific performance.”
BackgroundPublication bias and the canonization of false facts
Nissen, S. B., Magidson, T., Gross, K., & Bergstrom, C. T. (2016) · eLife · doi:10.7554/elife.21451 · Cited by 266
Replication, Communication, and the Population Dynamics of Scientific Discovery
McElreath, R., & Smaldino, P. E. (2015) · PLOS ONE · doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0136088 · Cited by 117
Scientific progress despite irreproducibility: A seeming paradox
Shiffrin, R. M., Börner, K., & Stigler, S. M. (2018) · Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences · doi:10.1073/pnas.1711786114 · Cited by 79 · cited 2×
“This seeming paradox of scientific progress despite irreproducibility has been recently noted by Shiffrin, Börner, and Stigler [20].”
Result
Cited by
Replicability, Robustness, and Reproducibility in Psychological Science
Nosek, B. A., Hardwicke, T. E., Moshontz, H., Allard, A., Corker, K. S., Dreber, A., Fidler, F., Hilgard, J., Kline Struhl, M., Nuijten, M. B., et al. (2022) · Annual Review of Psychology · doi:10.1146/annurev-psych-020821-114157 · Cited by 770
How Computational Modeling Can Force Theory Building in Psychological Science
Guest, O., & Martin, A. E. (2021) · Perspectives on Psychological Science · doi:10.1177/1745691620970585 · Cited by 460
van Rooij, I., & Baggio, G. (2021) · Perspectives on Psychological Science · doi:10.1177/1745691620970604 · Cited by 354
The case for formal methodology in scientific reform
Devezer, B., Navarro, D. J., Vandekerckhove, J., & Buzbas, E. O. (2020) · doi:10.1101/2020.04.26.048306 · Cited by 195
Self-citationOn the role of theory and modeling in neuroscience
Levenstein, D., Alvarez, V. A., Amarasingham, A., Azab, H., Chen, Z. S., Gerkin, R. C., Hasenstaub, A., Iyer, R., Jolivet, R. B., Marzen, S., et al. (2020) · arXiv · doi:10.48550/arxiv.2003.13825 · Cited by 93
Metadata
- Authors
- Devezer, B., Nardin, L. G., Baumgaertner, B., & Buzbas, E. O.
- Venue
- PLOS ONE
- Publisher
- Public Library of Science (PLoS)
- Published
- 2019-05-15
- Volume
- 14
- Issue
- 5
- Pages
- e0216125
- ISSN
- 1932-6203 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W2921898618
- Cited by
- 107
- References
- 9
- FWCI
- 77.62
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- gold
About these checks
Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.
Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.
Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.
What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›
Are you an author, or do you see a problem with this page? Request a review
How to cite
Cite CoChat for the checks on this page, and the paper for its own findings.
- This page
- CoChat. (2026). Citation check: Scientific discovery in a model-centric framework: Reproducibility, innovation, and epistemic diversity. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.1371/journal.pone.0216125
- The paper
- Devezer, B., Nardin, L. G., Baumgaertner, B., & Buzbas, E. O. (2019). Scientific discovery in a model-centric framework: Reproducibility, innovation, and epistemic diversity. PLOS ONE. https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0216125
Data sources
Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.