The DOI matches its Crossref record; 1 of the 1 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Trust, authority and epistemic responsibility
Abstract
In this paper I argue that the epistemology of trust and testimony should take into account the pragmatics of communication in order to gain insight about the responsibilities speakers and hearers share in the epistemic access they gain through communication. Communication is a rich process of information exchange in which epistemic standards are negotiated by interlocutors. I discuss examples which show the contextual adjustment of these standards as the conversation goes on. Our sensitivity to the contextual dimension of epistemic standards make us more responsible communicators.
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“This interpretation is consistent with accounts in social epistemology in which acceptance of a source and continued vigilance toward it can coexist rather than exclude one another (Origgi 2008;Sperber et al. 2010;Neuberger et al. 2025)”
From Epistemic Trust in Generative AI as an Information Source: Development and Validation of the Trust in AI-Epistemic Scale (TAI-E) (2026) · cites this paper as Origgi 2008
In the citing paper
“The TAI-E does not adjudicate that debate; instead, it operationalizes the narrower and more tractable notion of epistemic trust-the legitimacy a user grants a source and the acceptance of its outputs as warranting belief (Origgi 2008;Alvarado 2023b;Neuberger et al. 2025).”
From Epistemic Trust in Generative AI as an Information Source: Development and Validation of the Trust in AI-Epistemic Scale (TAI-E) (2026) · cites this paper as Origgi 2008
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Citations
Cites
The Relation between Children's and Mothers’ Mental State Language and Theory-of-Mind Understanding
Ruffman, T., Slade, L., & Crowe, E. (2002) · Child Development · doi:10.1111/1467-8624.00435 · Cited by 885
Cited by
SPERBER, D., CLÉMENT, F., HEINTZ, C., MASCARO, O., MERCIER, H., ORIGGI, G., & WILSON, D. (2010) · Mind & Language · doi:10.1111/j.1468-0017.2010.01394.x · Cited by 1,795
Self-citation(2015) · Springer eBooks · doi:10.1007/978-3-319-04093-6 · Cited by 483
The Onlife Manifesto: Being Human in a Hyperconnected Era
(2015) · Library Review · doi:10.1108/lr-04-2015-0034 · Cited by 335
Distributed Epistemic Responsibility in a Hyperconnected Era
Simon, J. (2015) · The Onlife Manifesto · doi:10.1007/978-3-319-04093-6_17 · Cited by 97
Balázs, L. (2026) · Social Sciences · doi:10.3390/socsci15070433 · Cited by 2
Metadata
- Authors
- ORIGGI, G.
- Venue
- THEORIA
- Publisher
- EHU Press
- Published
- 2008
- Volume
- 23
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- 35-44
- ISSN
- 2171-679X
- 0495-4548
- Cited by
- 37
- References
- 1
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- ORIGGI, G. (2008). Trust, authority and epistemic responsibility. THEORIA. https://doi.org/10.1387/theoria.4
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Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.