The DOI matches its Crossref record; 1 of the 1 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Towards a Timely Causality Analysis for Enterprise Security
Open accessAbstract
The increasingly sophisticated Advanced Persistent Threat (APT) attacks have become a serious challenge for enterprise IT security.Attack causality analysis, which tracks multi-hop causal relationships between files and processes to diagnose attack provenances and consequences, is the first step towards understanding APT attacks and taking appropriate responses.Since attack causality analysis is a time-critical mission, it is essential to design causality tracking systems that extract useful attack information in a timely manner.However, prior work is limited in serving this need.Existing approaches have largely focused on pruning causal dependencies totally irrelevant to the attack, but fail to differentiate and prioritize abnormal events from numerous relevant, yet benign and complicated system operations, resulting in long investigation time and slow responses.To address this problem, we propose PRIOTRACKER, a backward and forward causality tracker that automatically prioritizes the investigation of abnormal causal dependencies in the tracking process.Specifically, to assess the priority of a system event, we consider its rareness and topological features in the causality graph.To distinguish unusual operations from normal system events, we quantify the rareness of each event by developing a reference model which records common routine activities in corporate computer systems.We implement PRIOTRACKER, in 20K lines of Java code, and a reference model builder in 10K lines of Java code.We evaluate our tool by deploying both systems in a real enterprise IT environment, where we collect 1TB of 2.5 billion OS events from 150 machines in one week.Experimental results show that PRIOTRACKER can capture attack traces that are missed by existing trackers and reduce the analysis time by up to two orders of magnitude.
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Cites
SLEUTH: Real-time Attack Scenario Reconstruction from COTS Audit Data
Hossain, M. N., Milajerdi, S. M., Wang, J., Eshete, B., Gjomemo, R., Sekar, R., Stoller, S., & Venkatakrishnan, V. (2018) · arXiv · doi:10.48550/arxiv.1801.02062 · Cited by 176
Cited by
HOLMES: Real-Time APT Detection through Correlation of Suspicious Information Flows
Milajerdi, S. M., Gjomemo, R., Eshete, B., Sekar, R., & Venkatakrishnan, V. N. (2019) · 2019 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy (SP) · doi:10.1109/sp.2019.00026 · Cited by 573
UNICORN: Runtime Provenance-Based Detector for Advanced Persistent Threats
Han, X., Pasquier, T., Bates, A., Mickens, J., & Seltzer, M. (2020) · Proceedings 2020 Network and Distributed System Security Symposium · doi:10.14722/ndss.2020.24046 · Cited by 349
POIROT: Aligning Attack Behavior with Kernel Audit Records for Cyber Threat Hunting
Milajerdi, S. M., Eshete, B., Gjomemo, R., & Venkatakrishnan, V. N. (2019) · Proceedings of the 2019 ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security · doi:10.1145/3319535.3363217 · Cited by 300
Tactical Provenance Analysis for Endpoint Detection and Response Systems
Hassan, W. U., Bates, A., & Marino, D. (2020) · 2020 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy (SP) · doi:10.1109/sp40000.2020.00096 · Cited by 284
NODLINK: An Online System for Fine-Grained APT Attack Detection and Investigation
Li, S., Dong, F., Xiao, X., Wang, H., Shao, F., Chen, J., Guo, Y., Chen, X., & Li, D. (2024) · Proceedings 2024 Network and Distributed System Security Symposium · doi:10.14722/ndss.2024.23204 · Cited by 45
Self-citation
Metadata
- Authors
- Liu, Y., Zhang, M., Li, D., Jee, K., Li, Z., Wu, Z., Rhee, J., & Mittal, P.
- Venue
- Proceedings 2018 Network and Distributed System Security Symposium
- Publisher
- Internet Society
- Published
- 2018
- OpenAlex
- W2790557990
- Cited by
- 183
- References
- 1
- FWCI
- 11.56
- Type
- conference paper
- Language
- en
- Open access
- bronze
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