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Cited by 270

The DOI matches its Crossref record; 25 of the 25 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.

Anonymous Multi-Hop Locks for Blockchain Scalability and Interoperability

Open access
Malavolta, Giulio, Moreno-Sanchez, Pedro, Schneidewind, Clara, Kate, Aniket, Maffei, Matteo · 2019 · Proceedings 2019 Network and Distributed System Security Symposium

Abstract

Tremendous growth in cryptocurrency usage is exposing the inherent scalability issues with permissionless blockchain technology.Payment-channel networks (PCNs) have emerged as the most widely deployed solution to mitigate the scalability issues, allowing the bulk of payments between two users to be carried out off-chain.Unfortunately, as reported in the literature and further demonstrated in this paper, current PCNs do not provide meaningful security and privacy guarantees [30], [40].In this work, we study and design secure and privacypreserving PCNs.We start with a security analysis of existing PCNs, reporting a new attack that applies to all major PCNs, including the Lightning Network, and allows an attacker to steal the fees from honest intermediaries in the same payment path.We then formally define anonymous multi-hop locks (AMHLs), a novel cryptographic primitive that serves as a cornerstone for the design of secure and privacy-preserving PCNs.We present several provably secure cryptographic instantiations that make AMHLs compatible with the vast majority of cryptocurrencies.In particular, we show that (linear) homomorphic one-way functions suffice to construct AMHLs for PCNs supporting a script language (e.g., Ethereum).We also propose a construction based on ECDSA signatures that does not require scripts, thus solving a prominent open problem in the field.AMHLs constitute a generic primitive whose usefulness goes beyond multi-hop payments in a single PCN and we show how to realize atomic swaps and interoperable PCNs from this primitive.Finally, our performance evaluation on a commodity machine finds that AMHL operations can be performed in less than 100 milliseconds and require less than 500 bytes of communication overhead, even in the worst case.In fact, after acknowledging our attack, the Lightning Network developers have implemented our ECDSA-based AMHLs into their PCN.This demonstrates the practicality of our approach and its impact on the security, privacy, interoperability, and scalability of today's cryptocurrencies.

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Crossref · 10.14722/ndss.2019.23330

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Metadata

Authors
Malavolta, G., Moreno-Sanchez, P., Schneidewind, C., Kate, A., & Maffei, M.
Venue
Proceedings 2019 Network and Distributed System Security Symposium
Published
2019
OpenAlex
W2947736742
Cited by
270
References
25
FWCI
12.72
Type
conference paper
Language
en
Open access
bronze

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