DeepSight: Mitigating Backdoor Attacks in Federated Learning Through Deep Model Inspection
Open accessAbstract
Federated Learning (FL) allows multiple clients to collaboratively train a Neural Network (NN) model on their private data without revealing the data.Recently, several targeted poisoning attacks against FL have been introduced.These attacks inject a backdoor into the resulting model that allows adversarycontrolled inputs to be misclassified.Existing countermeasures against backdoor attacks are inefficient and often merely aim to exclude deviating models from the aggregation.However, this approach also removes benign models of clients with deviating data distributions, causing the aggregated model to perform poorly for such clients.To address this problem, we propose DeepSight, a novel model filtering approach for mitigating backdoor attacks.It is based on three novel techniques that allow to characterize the distribution of data used to train model updates and seek to measure finegrained differences in the internal structure and outputs of NNs.Using these techniques, DeepSight can identify suspicious model updates.We also develop a scheme that can accurately cluster model updates.Combining the results of both components, DeepSight is able to identify and eliminate model clusters containing poisoned models with high attack impact.We also show that the backdoor contributions of possibly undetected poisoned models can be effectively mitigated with existing weight clippingbased defenses.We evaluate the performance and effectiveness of DeepSight and show that it can mitigate state-of-the-art backdoor attacks with a negligible impact on the model's performance on benign data.
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The feasibility and effectiveness of defense during the aggregation phase have been proved in existing works when facing model poisoning backdoor attacks.
“The feasibility and effectiveness of defense during the aggregation phase have been proved in the existing works when facing model poisoning backdoor attacks [210].”
From Data and model poisoning backdoor attacks on wireless federated learning, and the defense mechanisms: A comprehensive survey (2024) · cites this paper as [210]
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References 41 · Cited by 202
Research works printed but not linked: 1
- S. Shen, S. Tople, and P. Saxena, "Auror: Defending Against Poisoning Attacks in Collaborative Deep Learning Systems," in Annual Computer Security Applications Conference (ACSAC), 2016.
- Authors
- Rieger, P., Nguyen, T. D., Miettinen, M., & Sadeghi, A.-R.
- Affiliations
- Technische Universität Darmstadt (DE)
- Venue
- Proceedings 2022 Network and Distributed System Security Symposium
- Publisher
- Internet Society
- Published
- 2022
- OpenAlex
- W4221129260
- Cited by
- 202
- References
- 41
- Citations by year
- 2026: 40 · 2025: 66 · 2024: 61 · 2023: 31 · 2022: 4
- FWCI
- 22.38
- Type
- conference paper
- Language
- en
- Open access
- bronze
- doi.org
- Locations
- Network and Distributed System Security Symposium (publishedVersion)
- arXiv (Cornell University) (submittedVersion)
- TUbilio (Technical University of Darmstadt) (submittedVersion)
- arXiv (Cornell University)
- Funders
- Bundesministerium für Bildung und Forschung
- Topics
- Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Artificial Intelligence › Adversarial Robustness in Machine Learning
- Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Artificial Intelligence › Privacy-Preserving Technologies in Data
- Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Artificial Intelligence › Security and Verification in Computing
- Keywords
- backdoor attacks, federated learning, poisoning attacks, weight clipping
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