Cited by 202Adversarial Robustness in Machine LearningPrivacy-Preserving Technologies in DataSecurity and Verification in Computing

DeepSight: Mitigating Backdoor Attacks in Federated Learning Through Deep Model Inspection

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Rieger, Phillip, Nguyen, Thien Duc, Miettinen, Markus, Sadeghi, Ahmad-Reza·2022·Proceedings 2022 Network and Distributed System Security Symposium

Abstract

Federated Learning (FL) allows multiple clients to collaboratively train a Neural Network (NN) model on their private data without revealing the data.Recently, several targeted poisoning attacks against FL have been introduced.These attacks inject a backdoor into the resulting model that allows adversarycontrolled inputs to be misclassified.Existing countermeasures against backdoor attacks are inefficient and often merely aim to exclude deviating models from the aggregation.However, this approach also removes benign models of clients with deviating data distributions, causing the aggregated model to perform poorly for such clients.To address this problem, we propose DeepSight, a novel model filtering approach for mitigating backdoor attacks.It is based on three novel techniques that allow to characterize the distribution of data used to train model updates and seek to measure finegrained differences in the internal structure and outputs of NNs.Using these techniques, DeepSight can identify suspicious model updates.We also develop a scheme that can accurately cluster model updates.Combining the results of both components, DeepSight is able to identify and eliminate model clusters containing poisoned models with high attack impact.We also show that the backdoor contributions of possibly undetected poisoned models can be effectively mitigated with existing weight clippingbased defenses.We evaluate the performance and effectiveness of DeepSight and show that it can mitigate state-of-the-art backdoor attacks with a negligible impact on the model's performance on benign data.

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References 41 · Cited by 202

Research works printed but not linked: 1

  1. S. Shen, S. Tople, and P. Saxena, "Auror: Defending Against Poisoning Attacks in Collaborative Deep Learning Systems," in Annual Computer Security Applications Conference (ACSAC), 2016.

Authors
Rieger, P., Nguyen, T. D., Miettinen, M., & Sadeghi, A.-R.
Affiliations
Technische Universität Darmstadt (DE)
Venue
Proceedings 2022 Network and Distributed System Security Symposium
Published
2022
OpenAlex
W4221129260
Cited by
202
References
41
Citations by year
2026: 40 · 2025: 66 · 2024: 61 · 2023: 31 · 2022: 4
FWCI
22.38
Type
conference paper
Language
en
Open access
Locations
  • Network and Distributed System Security Symposium (publishedVersion)
  • arXiv (Cornell University) (submittedVersion)
  • TUbilio (Technical University of Darmstadt) (submittedVersion)
  • arXiv (Cornell University)
Funders
Bundesministerium für Bildung und Forschung
Topics
  • Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Artificial Intelligence › Adversarial Robustness in Machine Learning
  • Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Artificial Intelligence › Privacy-Preserving Technologies in Data
  • Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Artificial Intelligence › Security and Verification in Computing
Keywords
backdoor attacks, federated learning, poisoning attacks, weight clipping

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