The DOI matches its Crossref record; 4 of the 4 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Who Cares about Auditor Reputation?*
Abstract
I provide evidence on the demand for auditor reputation by examining the defections of Arthur Andersen LLP's clients following the accounting scandals and criminal conviction marring the auditor's reputation in 2002. About 95 percent of clients in my sample did not switch auditors until after Andersen was indicted for criminal misconduct regarding its failed audit of Enron Corp. I test whether the timing of client defections and the choice of a new auditor are consistent with managers' incentives to mitigate potentially costly information and agency problems. I find that clients defected sooner, mostly to another Big 5 auditor, if they were more visible in the capital markets; such clients attracted more analysts and press coverage, had larger institutional ownership and share turnover, and raised more cash in recent security issues. However, my proxies for agency conflicts — managerial ownership and financial leverage — are not associated with the timing of defections or the choice of new auditor. Overall, my study suggests that firms more visible in the capital markets tend to be more concerned about engaging highly reputable auditors, consistent with such firms trying to build and preserve their own reputations for credible financial reporting.
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Citations
Cites
Healy, P. M., & Palepu, K. G. (2001) · Journal of Accounting and Economics · doi:10.1016/s0165-4101(01)00018-0 · Cited by 8,097
The Role of Market Forces in Assuring Contractual Performance
Klein, B., & Leffler, K. B. (1981) · Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1086/260996 · Cited by 3,653
Premiums for High Quality Products as Returns to Reputations
Shapiro, C. (1983) · The Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.2307/1881782 · Cited by 2,327
Do companies successfully engage in opinion-shopping? Evidence from the UK
Lennox, C. (2000) · Journal of Accounting and Economics · doi:10.1016/s0165-4101(00)00025-2 · Cited by 424
Cited by
A review of archival auditing research
DeFond, M., & Zhang, J. (2014) · Journal of Accounting and Economics · doi:10.1016/j.jacceco.2014.09.002 · Cited by 3,188
Market and Political/Regulatory Perspectives on the Recent Accounting Scandals
BALL, R. (2009) · Journal of Accounting Research · doi:10.1111/j.1475-679x.2009.00325.x · Cited by 483
Audit Quality and Auditor Reputation: Evidence from Japan
Skinner, D. J., & Srinivasan, S. (2012) · The Accounting Review · doi:10.2308/accr-50198 · Cited by 433
Does Auditor Reputation Matter? The Case of KPMG Germany and ComROAD AG
WEBER, J., WILLENBORG, M., & ZHANG, J. (2008) · Journal of Accounting Research · doi:10.1111/j.1475-679x.2008.00298.x · Cited by 389
Does Company Reputation Matter for Financial Reporting Quality? Evidence from Restatements*
CAO, Y., MYERS, L. A., & OMER, T. C. (2012) · Contemporary Accounting Research · doi:10.1111/j.1911-3846.2011.01137.x · Cited by 347
Metadata
- Authors
- BARTON, J.
- Venue
- Contemporary Accounting Research
- Publisher
- Wiley
- Published
- 2005-09
- Volume
- 22
- Issue
- 3
- Pages
- 549-586
- ISSN
- 0823-9150 (ISSN-L)
- 1911-3846
- OpenAlex
- W3125346725
- Cited by
- 244
- References
- 4
- FWCI
- 48.91
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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Data sources
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Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.