The DOI matches its Crossref record; 65 of the 65 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Corporate Board Governance and Voluntary Disclosure of Executive Compensation Practices*
Open accessAbstract
This study examines how corporate boards respond to investor demands for information on executive compensation practices and whether certain board and compensation committee characteristics, as proxies for board governance quality, are associated with the extent of board disclosure of compensation practices. A unique feature of this study is the development of a comprehensive checklist of 23 compensation-related items. I validate this index by showing that the disclosure scores are inversely related to two measures of information asymmetry: bid-ask spread and return volatility. This provides evidence that greater compensation disclosure reduces information asymmetry. The study presents some evidence that boards with the power to act independently from management provide more details about executive compensation practices. Moreover, it contributes to the literature on corporate governance and disclosure by showing that greater commitment of directors to perform their duties results in greater transparency.
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Cites
Separation of Ownership and Control
Fama, E. F., & Jensen, M. C. (1983) · The Journal of Law and Economics · doi:10.1086/467037 · Cited by 19,058
Agency Problems and the Theory of the Firm
Fama, E. F. (1980) · Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1086/260866 · Cited by 10,466
The Modern Industrial Revolution, Exit, and the Failure of Internal Control Systems
JENSEN, M. C. (1993) · The Journal of Finance · doi:10.1111/j.1540-6261.1993.tb04022.x · Cited by 8,528
Higher market valuation of companies with a small board of directors
Yermack, D. (1996) · Journal of Financial Economics · doi:10.1016/0304-405x(95)00844-5 · Cited by 6,603
Bid, ask and transaction prices in a specialist market with heterogeneously informed traders
Glosten, L. R., & Milgrom, P. R. (1985) · Journal of Financial Economics · doi:10.1016/0304-405x(85)90044-3 · Cited by 6,115
Audit committee, board of director characteristics, and earnings management
Klein, A. (2002) · Journal of Accounting and Economics · doi:10.1016/s0165-4101(02)00059-9 · Cited by 4,622
Corporate governance, chief executive officer compensation, and firm performance
Core, J. E., Holthausen, R. W., & Larcker, D. F. (1999) · Journal of Financial Economics · doi:10.1016/s0304-405x(98)00058-0 · Cited by 4,335
DECHOW, P. M., SLOAN, R. G., & SWEENEY, A. P. (1996) · Contemporary Accounting Research · doi:10.1111/j.1911-3846.1996.tb00489.x · Cited by 4,065
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Cited by
Composition and Activity of the Board of Directors: Impact on ESG Performance in the Banking System
Birindelli, G., Dell’Atti, S., Iannuzzi, A. P., & Savioli, M. (2018) · Sustainability · doi:10.3390/su10124699 · Cited by 459
Metadata
- Authors
- Laksmana, I.
- Venue
- Contemporary Accounting Research
- Publisher
- Wiley
- Published
- 2008-12
- Volume
- 25
- Issue
- 4
- Pages
- 1147-1182
- ISSN
- 0823-9150 (ISSN-L)
- 1911-3846
- OpenAlex
- W3124457484
- Cited by
- 409
- References
- 65
- FWCI
- 30.71
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
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Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.
