The DOI matches its Crossref record; 3 of the 3 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Do Investors Care about the Auditor's Economic Dependence on the Client?*
Open accessAbstract
In this study, we investigate whether investor perceptions of the financial reporting credibility of Big 5 audits are related to the auditor's economic dependence on the client as measured by nonaudit as well as total (audit and nonaudit) fees paid to the incumbent auditor. We use the client‐specific ex ante cost of equity capital as a proxy for investor perceptions of financial reporting credibility and examine auditor fees both as a proportion of the revenues of the audit firm and as a proportion of the revenues of the audit firm's practice office through which the audit was conducted. Our findings suggest that both nonaudit and total fees are perceived negatively by investors' that is, the higher the fees paid to the auditor, the greater the implied threat to auditor independence, and the lower the financial reporting credibility of a Big 5 audit. Furthermore, our findings appear to be largely unrelated to corporate governance: investors do not perceive the auditor as compensating for weak governance. Separately, recent anecdotal evidence suggests that declining revenues from nonaudit services' as a result of recent regulatory restrictions” are being offset by substantial increases in audit fees. Other things being equal, rising audit fees imply higher profit margins for audit services, indicating that the audit function may no longer be a loss leader. Thus, to the extent that investors perceive total fees negatively, recent regulatory initiatives to limit nonaudit fees may not have adequately addressed the perceived, if not the actual, threat to auditor independence posed by fees.
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Cites
The Cross‐Section of Expected Stock Returns
FAMA, E. F., & FRENCH, K. R. (1992) · The Journal of Finance · doi:10.1111/j.1540-6261.1992.tb04398.x · Cited by 17,261
Bozdogan, H. (1987) · Psychometrika · doi:10.1007/bf02294361 · Cited by 4,468
Auditor Reputation and the Pricing of Initial Public Offerings.
Beatty, R. P. (1989) · The Accounting Review · doi:10.2308/tar-4478058 · Cited by 634
Cited by
Understanding earnings quality: A review of the proxies, their determinants and their consequences
Dechow, P., Ge, W., & Schrand, C. (2010) · Journal of Accounting and Economics · doi:10.1016/j.jacceco.2010.09.001 · Cited by 4,159
A review of archival auditing research
DeFond, M., & Zhang, J. (2014) · Journal of Accounting and Economics · doi:10.1016/j.jacceco.2014.09.002 · Cited by 3,188
Auditor Independence and Audit Quality: A Literature Review
Tepalagul, N., & Lin, L. (2015) · Journal of Accounting, Auditing & Finance · doi:10.1177/0148558x14544505 · Cited by 339
Do the Big 4 and the Second-tier firms provide audits of similar quality?
Boone, J. P., Khurana, I. K., & Raman, K. K. (2010) · Journal of Accounting and Public Policy · doi:10.1016/j.jaccpubpol.2010.06.007 · Cited by 328
Self-citationAccounting Knowledge on Trial: Forensic Accountant Communication in Litigation
Donahoo, N. (2024) · SSRN Electronic Journal · doi:10.2139/ssrn.4898021 · Cited by 1
Metadata
- Authors
- Khurana, I. K., & Raman, K. K.
- Venue
- Contemporary Accounting Research
- Publisher
- Wiley
- Published
- 2006-12
- Volume
- 23
- Issue
- 4
- Pages
- 977-1016
- ISSN
- 0823-9150 (ISSN-L)
- 1911-3846
- OpenAlex
- W2080520925
- Cited by
- 165
- References
- 3
- FWCI
- 16.72
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
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- Khurana, I. K., & Raman, K. K. (2006). Do Investors Care about the Auditor's Economic Dependence on the Client?*. Contemporary Accounting Research. https://doi.org/10.1506/d171-8534-4458-k037
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