The DOI matches its Crossref record; 7 of the 7 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
While Dangers Gather: Congressional Checks on Presidential War Powers
Abstract
Nearly five hundred times in the past century, American presidents have deployed the nation's military abroad, on missions ranging from embassy evacuations to full-scale wars. The question of whether Congress has effectively limited the president's power to do so has generally met with a resounding "no." In While Dangers Gather , William Howell and Jon Pevehouse reach a very different conclusion. The authors--one an American politics scholar, the other an international relations scholar--provide the most comprehensive and compelling evidence to date on Congress's influence on presidential war powers. Their findings have profound implications for contemporary debates about war, presidential power, and Congress's constitutional obligations. While devoting special attention to the 2003 invasion of Iraq, this book systematically analyzes the last half-century of U.S. military policy. Among its conclusions: Presidents are systematically less likely to exercise military force when their partisan opponents retain control of Congress. The partisan composition of Congress, however, matters most for proposed deployments that are larger in size and directed at less strategically important locales. Moreover, congressional influence is often achieved not through bold legislative action but through public posturing--engaging the media, raising public concerns, and stirring domestic and international doubt about the United States' resolve to see a fight through to the end.
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“The thrust of this literature is that, although presidents may exercise power through unilateral action, they cannot do everything they want and are often constrained-affecting how they use their unilateral powers, and indeed, whether they use them at all (Chiou & Rothenberg, 2017;Howell & Pevehouse, 2007;Kriner, 2010;Rudalevige, 2021;Staudt, 2011).”
From The strongman presidency and the two logics of presidential power (2023) · cites this paper as Howell & Pevehouse, 2007
Citations
Cites
Theory of International Politics, by Kenneth N. Waltz
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International Crises and Domestic Politics
Smith, A. M. (1998) · American Political Science Review · doi:10.2307/2585485 · Cited by 460
Taken by storm: the media, public opinion, and U.S. foreign policy in the Gulf War
(1995) · Choice Reviews Online · doi:10.5860/choice.32-2541 · Cited by 410
While dangers gather: congressional checks on presidential war powers
(2008) · Choice Reviews Online · doi:10.5860/choice.45-3476 · Cited by 185
Stoll, R. J. (1987) · American Politics Research · doi:10.1177/004478087015002002 · Cited by 38
A Report: Public Opinion About United States Intervention in El Salvador and Nicaragua
Sobel, R. (1989) · Public Opinion Quarterly · doi:10.1086/269145 · Cited by 36
The Two Presidencies Thesis Revisited at a Time of Political Dissensus
Oldfield, D. M. (2017) · Routledge eBooks · doi:10.4324/9781315131078-3 · Cited by 4
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Tama, J. (2025) · Zeitschrift für Außen- und Sicherheitspolitik · doi:10.1007/s12399-025-01067-0
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Partisan Control and Foreign Policy in the U.S. Congress
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Metadata
- Authors
- Howell, W. G., & Pevehouse, J.
- Venue
- Princeton University Press eBooks
- Publisher
- Princeton University Press
- Published
- 2007-01-01
- OpenAlex
- W2251396759
- Cited by
- 219
- References
- 7
- Citations by year
- 2026: 8 · 2025: 18 · 2024: 7 · 2023: 8 · 2022: 7 · 2021: 15 · 2020: 9 · 2019: 25 · 2018: 13 · 2017: 9 · 2016: 13 · 2015: 7 · 2014: 7 · 2013: 21 · 2012: 12
- FWCI
- 16.00
- Type
- book
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
- Locations
- Princeton University Press eBooks (publishedVersion)
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Political Science and International Relations › American Constitutional Law and Politics
- Social Sciences › Political Science and International Relations › International Relations and Foreign Policy
- Social Sciences › Economics, Econometrics and Finance › Economics and Econometrics › Defense, Military, and Policy Studies
- Keywords
- presidential war powers, congressional influence, separation of powers, 2003 invasion of Iraq, military deployment, executive-legislative relations, presidential power
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