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The Power and Independence of the Federal Reserve
Abstract
The independence of the Federal Reserve is considered a cornerstone of its identity, crucial for keeping monetary policy decisions free of electoral politics. But do we really understand what is meant by "Federal Reserve independence"? Using scores of examples from the Fed's rich history, The Power and Independence of the Federal Reserve shows that much common wisdom about the nation's central bank is inaccurate. Legal scholar and financial historian Peter Conti-Brown provides an in-depth look at the Fed's place in government, its internal governance structure, and its relationships to such individuals and groups as the president, Congress, economists, and bankers. Exploring how the Fed regulates the global economy and handles its own internal politics, and how the law does—and does not—define the Fed's power, Conti-Brown captures and clarifies the central bank's defining complexities. He examines the foundations of the Federal Reserve Act of 1913, which established a system of central banks, and the ways that subsequent generations have redefined the organization. Challenging the notion that the Fed Chair controls the organization as an all-powerful technocrat, he explains how institutions and individuals—within and outside of government—shape Fed policy. Conti-Brown demonstrates that the evolving mission of the Fed—including systemic risk regulation, wider bank supervision, and as a guardian against inflation and deflation—requires a reevaluation of the very way the nation's central bank is structured. Investigating how the Fed influences and is influenced by ideologies, personalities, law, and history, The Power and Independence of the Federal Reserve offers a clear picture of this uniquely important institution.
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In the citing paper
“This is one of the central reasons why official currencies nowadays are governed by independent central bankers rather than by elected politicians (Conti-Brown 2016).”
From The Ethics of Alternative Currencies (2022) · cites this paper as Conti-Brown 2016
In the citing paper
“In that regard, it is debatable whether any currency, whether official or alternative, can be said to be democratic, for elected officials have little, if any, influence on monetary policy (e.g., ContiBrown 2016).”
From The Ethics of Alternative Currencies (2022) · cites this paper as ContiBrown 2016
Citations
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Cited by 148
Metadata
- Authors
- Conti-Brown, P.
- Venue
- Princeton University Press eBooks
- Publisher
- Princeton University Press
- Published
- 2016-01-26
- OpenAlex
- W4300025555
- Cited by
- 148
- References
- 0
- Citations by year
- 2026: 4 · 2025: 8 · 2024: 8 · 2023: 14 · 2022: 11 · 2021: 9 · 2020: 32 · 2019: 12 · 2018: 41 · 2017: 4 · 2016: 4
- FWCI
- 27.77
- Type
- book
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
- Locations
- Princeton University Press eBooks (publishedVersion)
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Economics, Econometrics and Finance › General Economics, Econometrics and Finance › Monetary Policy and Economic Impact
- Social Sciences › Economics, Econometrics and Finance › Finance › Banking stability, regulation, efficiency
- Social Sciences › Political Science and International Relations › Political and Economic history of UK and US
- Keywords
- Federal Reserve, central bank independence, monetary policy, Federal Reserve Act of 1913, central banking history, banking supervision, inflation and deflation, central bank politics
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- Conti-Brown, P. (2016). The Power and Independence of the Federal Reserve. Princeton University Press eBooks. https://doi.org/10.1515/9781400873500