Self-Legislation in Kant's Moral Philosophy
The DOI matches its Crossref record; 1 of the 1 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
Kant famously insisted that “the idea of the will of every rational being as a universally legislative will” is the supreme principle of morality. Recent interpreters have taken this emphasis on the self-legislation of the moral law as evidence that Kant endorsed a distinctively constructivist conception of morality according to which the moral law is a positive law, created by us. But a closer historical examination suggests otherwise. Kant developed his conception of legislation in the context of his opposition to theological voluntarist accounts of morality and his engagement with conceptions of obligation found in his Wolffian predecessors. In order to defend important claims about the necessity and immediacy of moral obligation, Kant drew and refined a distinction between the legislation and authorship of the moral law in a way that precludes standard theological voluntarist theories and presents an obstacle to recent constructivist interpretations. A correct understanding of Kant's development and use of this distinction reveals that his conception of legislation leaves little room for constructivist moral anti-realism.
Overview
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Free: it reads the open-access text and checks the first 5 claims that cite a source we can check. Create a free account to check every claim.
Integrity signals
Registry
Cites
Statistics
Verification
Claims the paper makes
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Free: it reads the open-access text and checks the first 5 claims that cite a source we can check. Create a free account to check every claim.
Self-check
Percentages, sums and reported differences re-computed from the paper’s own numbers.
The self-check needs the paper’s full text.
Citations
Cites
KANT'S FORMULA OF UNIVERSAL LAW
Korsgaard, C. M. (1985) · Pacific Philosophical Quarterly · doi:10.1111/j.1468-0114.1985.tb00240.x · Cited by 124
Cited by
LeBar, M. (2008) · Social Philosophy and Policy · doi:10.1017/s0265052508080072 · Cited by 281
Metadata
- Authors
- Kain, P.
- Venue
- Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie
- Publisher
- Walter de Gruyter GmbH
- Published
- 2004-01-29
- Volume
- 86
- Issue
- 3
- ISSN
- 0003-9101 (ISSN-L)
- 1613-0650
- OpenAlex
- W1999011793
- Cited by
- 186
- References
- 1
- FWCI
- 19.87
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- de
- Open access
- closed
About these checks
Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.
Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.
Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.
What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›
Are you an author, or do you see a problem with this page? Request a review
How to cite
Cite CoChat for the checks on this page, and the paper for its own findings.
- This page
- CoChat. (2026). Citation check: Self-Legislation in Kant's Moral Philosophy. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.1515/agph.2004.86.3.257
- The paper
- Kain, P. (2004). Self-Legislation in Kant's Moral Philosophy. Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie. https://doi.org/10.1515/agph.2004.86.3.257
Data sources
Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.