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The Overtone Model of Self-Deception
Open accessAbstract
In this paper I will argue for what I call an ‘overtone model of self-deception’. The analogy to overtones (higher-order frequencies of a tone) is as follows: a self-deceiver’s optimal degree of instability (the term is borrowed from Friston et al. 2012, and applied to self-deception) is elevated so that constant exploration (of a certain number of hypotheses) is pursued instead of disambiguation in favor of a certain hypothesis. These hypotheses are explored in parallel (for similar ideas with respect to higher-order cognition in general see Pezzulo and Cisek 2016, and Metzinger 2017) and are like overtones of the currently active self-deceptive hypothesis (the base frequency) so that what we as self-deceivers, as well as observers, perceive as one tone (self-deception) is actually a fusion of different frequencies. The term ‘fusion’ is relevant because the phenomenology of the self-deceiver is co-determined by overtones.
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“Despite many open questions, conceiving of phenomenal transparency-opacity as resulting from inference in temporally thick generative models allows new ways of asking questions about empirically tractable phenomena like self-reflection, metacognition (Schooler et al., 2011), and self-deception (Dehaene et al., 2017; Pliushch, 2017; Limanowski, 2017).”
From 'Seeing the Dark': Grounding Phenomenal Transparency and Opacity in Precision Estimation for Active Inference (2018) · cites this paper as Pliushch, 2017
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Cited by 3
Metadata
- Authors
- Pliushch, I.
- Corresponding author
- Pliushch, Iuliia
- Venue
- Theoretical Philosophy/MIND Group – JGU Mainz
- Publisher
- Theoretical Philosophy/MIND Group – JGU Mainz
- Published
- 2017
- OpenAlex
- W2607344273
- Cited by
- 3
- References
- 0
- Citations by year
- 2024: 1 · 2018: 1 · 2017: 1
- FWCI
- 0.71
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
- doi.org
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Philosophy and Theoretical Science
- Life Sciences › Neuroscience › Cognitive Neuroscience › Embodied and Extended Cognition
- Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics
- Keywords
- self-deception, overtones, higher-order cognition
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