The DOI matches its Crossref record; 77 of the 77 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Religion and Preferences for Social Insurance
Abstract
In this paper we argue that religion and welfare state spending are substitute mechanisms that insure individuals against adverse life events. As a result, individuals who are religious are predicted to prefer lower levels of social insurance than will individuals who are secular. To the extent policy outcomes reflect individual preferences, then countries with higher levels of religiosity should have lower levels of welfare state spending. In formalizing our argument we also suggest that if benefits from religion are subject to a network externality (I derive greater pleasure from religion when others are also religious), it is possible for countries that are similar in terms of underlying conditions to exhibit multiple equilibria with respect to religion and social insurance. We empirically test our predictions using individual-level data on religiosity, individual-level data on social insurance preferences, and cross-country data on social spending outcomes. The findings are strongly supportive of our hypotheses.
Overview
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Run the check — free, no account needed. It reads the open-access text and checks the sources it cites.
Integrity signals
Registry
Cites
Statistics
Verification
Claims the paper makes
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Run the check — free, no account needed. It reads the open-access text and checks the sources it cites.
Self-check
Percentages, sums and reported differences re-computed from the paper’s own numbers.
The self-check needs the paper’s full text.
Citations
Cites
“Stress: appraisal and coping,”
Folkman, S. (2013) · Encyclopedia of Behavioral Medicine · doi:10.1007/978-1-4419-1005-9_215 · Cited by 27,833
The three worlds of welfare capitalism
(1990) · Choice Reviews Online · doi:10.5860/choice.28-1046 · Cited by 16,528
Network Externalities, Competition, and Compatibility
Katz, M. L. (1985) · American Economic Review · Cited by 6,052
A Rational Theory of the Size of Government
Meltzer, A. H., & Richard, S. F. (1981) · Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1086/261013 · Cited by 5,485
Personal Religious Orientation and Prejudice.
Allport, G. W., & Ross, J. M. (1967) · Journal of Personality and Social Psychology · doi:10.1037/0022-3514.5.4.432 · Cited by 4,533
The New Politics of the Welfare State
(2001) · doi:10.1093/0198297564.001.0001 · Cited by 3,228
Appraisal, coping, health status, and psychological symptoms
Folkman, S., Lazarus, R. S., Gruen, R. J., & DeLongis, A. (1986) · Journal of Personality and Social Psychology · doi:10.1037/0022-3514.50.3.571 · Cited by 2,917
The Cyclical Behavior of Equilibrium Unemployment and Vacancies
Shimer, R. (2005) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/0002828053828572 · Cited by 2,731
Clark, A. E., & Oswald, A. J. (1994) · The Economic Journal · doi:10.2307/2234639 · Cited by 2,562
Appraisal Processes in Emotion: Theory, Methods, Research
(2001) · doi:10.1093/oso/9780195130072.001.0001 · Cited by 2,384
Cited by
Belief in a Just World and Redistributive Politics
Benabou, R., & Tirole, J. (2006) · The Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.1162/qjec.2006.121.2.699 · Cited by 1,036
McCleary, R. M., & Barro, R. J. (2006) · Journal of Economic Perspectives · doi:10.1257/jep.20.2.49 · Cited by 894
Explaining Social Policy Preferences: Evidence from the Great Recession
MARGALIT, Y. (2013) · American Political Science Review · doi:10.1017/s0003055412000603 · Cited by 651
Inequality and Democratization: An Elite-Competition Approach
Ansell, B. W., & Samuels, D. J. (2014) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511843686 · Cited by 547
Risks and Redistribution: An Individual-Level Analysis
Rehm, P. (2009) · Comparative Political Studies · doi:10.1177/0010414008330595 · Cited by 518
Metadata
- Authors
- Scheve, K.
- Venue
- Quarterly Journal of Political Science
- Publisher
- Emerald
- Published
- 2006-07-26
- Volume
- 1
- Issue
- 3
- Pages
- 255-286
- ISSN
- 1554-0626 (ISSN-L)
- 1554-0634
- OpenAlex
- W2142158741
- Cited by
- 463
- References
- 77
- FWCI
- 59.29
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
About these checks
Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.
Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.
Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.
What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›
Are you an author, or do you see a problem with this page? Request a review
How to cite
Cite CoChat for the checks on this page, and the paper for its own findings.
- This page
- CoChat. (2026). Citation check: Religion and Preferences for Social Insurance. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.1561/100.00005052
- The paper
- Scheve, K. (2006). Religion and Preferences for Social Insurance. Quarterly Journal of Political Science. https://doi.org/10.1561/100.00005052
Data sources
Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.