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Cited by 359

The DOI matches its Crossref record; 36 of the 36 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.

Electoral Rules and Government Spending in Parliamentary Democracies

Persson, Torsten, Roland, Gerard, Tabellini, Guido·2007·Quarterly Journal of Political Science
DOI 10.1561/100.00006019
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Abstract

We present a theoretical model of a parliamentary democracy where electoral competition inside coalition governments induces higher spending than under single party governments. Policy preferences of parties are endogenous and derived from opportunistic reelection motives. The electoral rule affects government spending, but only indirectly: proportional elections induce a more fragmented party system and a larger incidence of coalition governments than do majoritarian elections. Empirical evidence from post-war parliamentary democracies strongly supports these predictions.

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Metadata

Authors
Persson, T., Roland, G., & Tabellini, G.
Venue
Quarterly Journal of Political Science
Publisher
Emerald
Published
2007-05-15
Volume
2
Issue
2
Pages
155-188
ISSN
  • 1554-0626 (ISSN-L)
  • 1554-0634
DOI
10.1561/100.00006019
OpenAlex
W2889698073
Cited by
359
References
36
FWCI
106.53
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
closed

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CoChat. (2026). Citation check: Electoral Rules and Government Spending in Parliamentary Democracies. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.1561/100.00006019
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Persson, T., Roland, G., & Tabellini, G. (2007). Electoral Rules and Government Spending in Parliamentary Democracies. Quarterly Journal of Political Science. https://doi.org/10.1561/100.00006019

Data sources

Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.

Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).

Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.