Cited by 17Mobile Crowdsensing and CrowdsourcingOnline Learning and AnalyticsGame Theory and Voting Systems

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Practical Peer Prediction for Peer Assessment

Open access
Shnayder, Victor, Parkes, David·2016·Proceedings of the AAAI Conference on Human Computation and Crowdsourcing

Abstract

We provide an empirical analysis of peer prediction mechanisms, which reward participants for information in settings when there is no ground truth against which to score reports. We simulate the mechanisms on a dataset of three million peer assessments from the edX MOOC platform. We evaluate different mechanisms on score variability, which is connected to fairness, risk aversion, and participant learning. We also assess the magnitude of the incentives to invest effort, and study the effect of participant coordination on low-information signals. We find that the correlated agreement mechanism has lower variation in reward than other mechanisms. A concern is that the gain from exerting effort is relatively low across all mechanisms, due to frequent disagreement between peers. Our conclusions are relevant for crowdsourcing in education as well as other domains.

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  • Peer assessment scales well to large class sizes.

    “Not only does it scale well to large class sizes, such as those in massive open online classes (MOOCs) (Shnayder & Parkes, 2016)”

    From Assessment in the age of artificial intelligence (2022) · cites this paper as Shnayder & Parkes, 2016

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  • Peer and self assessment in massive online classes

    Kulkarni, C., Wei, K. P., Le, H., Chia, D., Papadopoulos, K., Cheng, J., Koller, D., & Klemmer, S. R. (2013) · ACM Transactions on Computer-Human Interaction · doi:10.1145/2505057 · Cited by 390 · cited 4×

    “Figure 2 shows the full distribution of the number of prompts per course.”
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Metadata

Authors
Shnayder, V., & Parkes, D.
Affiliations
Harvard University (US)
Venue
Proceedings of the AAAI Conference on Human Computation and Crowdsourcing
Published
2016-09-21
Volume
4
Pages
199-208
ISSN
  • 2769-1330 (ISSN-L)
  • 2769-1349
OpenAlex
W2601131632
Cited by
17
References
1
Citations by year
2025: 3 · 2023: 4 · 2022: 4 · 2021: 2 · 2020: 2 · 2018: 1 · 2017: 1
FWCI
0.53
Type
conference paper
Language
en
Open access
Locations
  • Proceedings of the AAAI Conference on Human Computation and Crowdsourcing (publishedVersion)
  • AAAI Publications (The Association for the Advancement of Artificial Intelligence (AAAI)) (submittedVersion)
  • Digital Access to Scholarship at Harvard (DASH) (Harvard University) (submittedVersion, cc-by)
Funders
National Science Foundation (1301976)
Topics
  • Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Computer Science Applications › Mobile Crowdsensing and Crowdsourcing
  • Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Computer Science Applications › Online Learning and Analytics
  • Social Sciences › Economics, Econometrics and Finance › Economics and Econometrics › Game Theory and Voting Systems
Keywords
peer prediction, peer assessment, incentive mechanisms, score variability, fairness, risk aversion, effort incentives, MOOCs

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