The DOI matches its Crossref record; 1 of the 1 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Incentives and Test-Based Accountability in Education
Abstract
In recent years there have been increasing efforts to use accountability systems based on large-scale tests of students as a mechanism for improving student achievement. The federal No Child Left Behind Act (NCLB) is a prominent example of such an effort, but it is only the continuation of a steady trend toward greater test-based accountability in education that has been going on for decades. Over time, such accountability systems included ever-stronger incentives to motivate school administrators, teachers, and students to perform better. Incentives and Test-Based Accountability in Education reviews and synthesizes relevant research from economics, psychology, education, and related fields about how incentives work in educational accountability systems. The book helps identify circumstances in which test-based incentives may have a positive or a negative impact on student learning and offers recommendations for how to improve current test-based accountability policies. The most important directions for further research are also highlighted. For the first time, research and theory on incentives from the fields of economics, psychology, and educational measurement have all been pulled together and synthesized. Incentives and Test-Based Accountability in Education will inform people about the motivation of educators and students and inform policy discussions about NCLB and state accountability systems. Education researchers, K-12 school administrators and teachers, as well as graduate students studying education policy and educational measurement will use this book to learn more about the motivation of educators and students. Education policy makers at all levels of government will rely on this book to inform policy discussions about NCLB and state accountability systems.
Overview
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Run the check — free, no account needed. It reads the open-access text and checks the sources it cites.
Integrity signals
Registry
Cites
Statistics
Verification
Claims the paper makes
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Run the check — free, no account needed. It reads the open-access text and checks the sources it cites.
Self-check
Percentages, sums and reported differences re-computed from the paper’s own numbers.
The self-check needs the paper’s full text.
Citations
Cites
Searching for Effective Teachers with Imperfect Information
Staiger, D. O., & Rockoff, J. E. (2010) · Journal of Economic Perspectives · doi:10.1257/jep.24.3.97 · Cited by 345 · cited 1×
“The second combination is a frequently mentioned possible change in discussions about teacher quality—incentives for individual teachers in the form of sanctions that require teachers whose students do not meet some test-based level of performance to leave the profession (see, e.g., Lang, 2010; Staiger and Rockoff, 20…”
Background
Cited by
Ryan, R. M., & Deci, E. L. (2020) · Contemporary Educational Psychology · doi:10.1016/j.cedpsych.2020.101860 · Cited by 6,037
Au, W. (2016) · Educational Policy · doi:10.1177/0895904815614916 · Cited by 452
Education and Poverty: Confronting the Evidence
Ladd, H. F. (2012) · Journal of Policy Analysis and Management · doi:10.1002/pam.21615 · Cited by 266
Freitas, L. C. D. (2012) · Educação & Sociedade · doi:10.1590/s0101-73302012000200004 · Cited by 265
Teacher Evaluation Policy and Conflicting Theories of Motivation
Firestone, W. A. (2014) · Educational Researcher · doi:10.3102/0013189x14521864 · Cited by 159
Metadata
- Venue
- National Academies Press eBooks
- Publisher
- National Academies Press
- Published
- 2011-10-18
- OpenAlex
- W1528871697
- Cited by
- 194
- References
- 1
- FWCI
- 20.93
- Type
- book
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
About these checks
Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.
Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.
Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.
What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›
Are you an author, or do you see a problem with this page? Request a review
How to cite
Cite CoChat for the checks on this page, and the paper for its own findings.
- This page
- CoChat. (2026). Citation check: Incentives and Test-Based Accountability in Education. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.17226/12521
- The paper
- Incentives and Test-Based Accountability in Education. (2011). National Academies Press eBooks. https://doi.org/10.17226/12521
Data sources
Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.