The DOI matches its OpenAlex record; 7 of the 7 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
The corporate governance lessons from the financial crisis
Abstract
This report analyses the impact of failures and weaknesses in corporate governance on the financial crisis, including risk management systems and executive salaries. It concludes that the financial crisis can be to an important extent attributed to failures and weaknesses in corporate governance arrangements which did not serve their purpose to safeguard against excessive risk taking in a number of financial services companies. Accounting standards and regulatory requirements have also proved insufficient in some areas. Last but not least, remuneration systems have in a number of cases not been closely related to the strategy and risk appetite of the company and its longer term interests. The article also suggests that the importance of qualified board oversight and robust risk management is not limited to financial institutions. The remuneration of boards and senior management also remains a highly controversial issue in many OECD countries. The current turmoil suggests a need for the OECD to re-examine the adequacy of its corporate governance principles in these key areas.
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Cites
Erkens, D. H., Hung, M., & Matos, P. (2012) · Journal of Corporate Finance · doi:10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2012.01.005 · Cited by 1,202
Risk management, corporate governance, and bank performance in the financial crisis
Aebi, V., Sabato, G., & Schmid, M. (2012) · Journal of Banking & Finance · doi:10.1016/j.jbankfin.2011.10.020 · Cited by 1,053
Bank board structure and performance: Evidence for large bank holding companies
Adams, R. B., & Mehran, H. (2012) · Journal of Financial Intermediation · doi:10.1016/j.jfi.2011.09.002 · Cited by 660
Chen, C. R., Steiner, T. L., & Whyte, A. M. (2005) · Journal of Banking & Finance · doi:10.1016/j.jbankfin.2005.06.004 · Cited by 332
The Mortgage and Financial Crises: The Role of Credit Risk Management and Corporate Governance
Lang, W. W., & Jagtiani, J. A. (2010) · Atlantic Economic Journal · doi:10.1007/s11293-010-9221-7 · Cited by 76
Strong Managers, Weak Boards?*
Adams, R. B., & Ferreiraz, D. (2016) · Cited by 36
CEO Option Compensation, Risk-Taking Incentives, and Systemic Risk in the Banking IndustryPreprint
Li, L., Ma, M. L. Z., & Song, F. M. (2013) · SSRN Electronic Journal · doi:10.2139/ssrn.2201413 · Cited by 4
Cited by
Erkens, D. H., Hung, M., & Matos, P. (2012) · Journal of Corporate Finance · doi:10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2012.01.005 · Cited by 1,202
ESG in Focus: The Australian Evidence
Galbreath, J. (2013) · Journal of Business Ethics · doi:10.1007/s10551-012-1607-9 · Cited by 451
Grove, H., Patelli, L., Victoravich, L. M., & Xu, P. T. (2011) · Corporate Governance: An International Review · doi:10.1111/j.1467-8683.2011.00882.x · Cited by 403
Do ESG strategies enhance bank stability during financial turmoil? Evidence from Europe
Chiaramonte, L., Dreassi, A., Girardone, C., & Piserà, S. (2022) · The European Journal of Finance · doi:10.1080/1351847x.2021.1964556 · Cited by 389
Female directors, board committees and firm performance
Green, C. P., & Homroy, S. (2018) · European Economic Review · doi:10.1016/j.euroecorev.2017.12.003 · Cited by 346
Metadata
- Authors
- Kirkpatrick, G.
- Venue
- OECD Journal Financial Market Trends
- Publisher
- Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
- Published
- 2009-09-26
- Volume
- 2009
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- 61-87
- ISSN
- 1995-2864 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W3121898682
- Cited by
- 914
- References
- 7
- FWCI
- 199.81
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
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