The trolley problem revisited an exploratory study
Open accessAbstract
Recent studies by cognitive scientists demonstrate that people’s choices are more complex than the image provided by rational choice theory, and consistency of choice is not a characteristic to be expected in real-life situations. This exploratory paper attempts to isolate three variables in relation to decision making. Working with a sample (N=70) of university students in the U.S, and using the three variants of the Trolley Problem, the subjects’ responses are used to identify the similarities and differences based on the three dimensions. The participants were asked to respond to three hypothetical situations regarding a runaway trolley. Their decision in the first scenario could save a person’s life or let him be run over by the trolley. In the second scenario, their decision could either let one person die and save five lives or save one life and let five people be killed. These two scenarios require pulling a lever to switch the trolley from one track to another. The third scenario requires pushing an obese person in front of the runaway trolley to stop it from killing five persons. The paper presents the findings on the three variables: gender, age, and relational status.
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Run the check — free, no account needed. It reads the open-access text and checks the sources it cites.
Integrity signals
Registry
Cites
Statistics
Claims the paper makes
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Run the check — free, no account needed. It reads the open-access text and checks the sources it cites.
Claims other papers make about this one
Each is checked against this paper’s own text: does it say what the citing paper says it does?
Utilitarianism has garnered the highest support in previous surveys of trolley dilemma.
“Among these approaches, utilitarianism, advocating for the preservation of more lives at the expense of fewer, has garnered the highest support in previous surveys of trolley dilemma (Hauser et al., 2007; Rehman and Dzionek Kozłowska, 2018; de Melo et al., 2021).”
From Exploring moral algorithm preferences in autonomous vehicle dilemmas: an empirical study (2023) · cites this paper as Rehman and Dzionek Kozłowska, 2018
In §3.2 (Data and results), the study reports that 87% of its respondents chose to sacrifice one person to save five in the switch scenario, and 61% chose to do so in the Fat Man scenario. That supports substantial preference for the life-saving choice in this survey, but the paper does not establish that utilitarianism garnered the highest support across previous surveys; it cautions that its small sample may not generalize. (LLM, conf=0.85)
Experimental — accuracy not yet measured
Self-check
Percentages, sums and reported differences re-computed from the paper’s own numbers.
The self-check needs the paper’s full text.
The citation lists haven’t been fetched yet
References 17 · Cited by 8
Research works printed but not linked: 11
- Bleske-Rechek, A., Nelson, L. A., Baker, J. P., Remiker, M. W. & Brandt, S. J. (2010). Evolution and the Trolley Problem: People save five over one unless the one is young, genetically related, or a romantic partner. Journal of Social, Evolutionary, and Cultural Psychology, 4(3), 115-127.
- Bourget, D. & Chalmers, D. J. (2014). What do philosophers believe? Philosophical Studies, 170(3), 465-500.
- Dzionek-Kozlowska, J. & Rehman, S. N. (2017). Attitudes of economics and sociology students towards cooperation. A cross-cultural study. Economics and Sociology, 10(4), 124-136. doi: 10.14254/2071-789X.2017/10-4/10 · DOI
- Erdle, S., Sansom, M., Cole, M., & Heapy, N. (1992). Sex differences in personality correlates of helping behavior. Personality and Individual Difference, 13(8), 931-936.
- Foot, P. (1967). The problem of abortion and the doctrine of the double effect. Oxford Review, 5, 5-15.
- Lanteri, A., Chelini, C. & Rizzello, S. (2008). An experimental investigation of emotions and rea- soning in the Trolley Problem. Journal of Business Ethics, 83, 789-804.
- Prelec, D. & Loewenstein, G. (1991). Negative time preference. American Economic Review, 81(2), 347-352.
- Rubinstein, A. (2006). A sceptic's comment on the study of economics. Economic Journal, 116, C1-C9.
- Singer, P. (2005). Ethics and intuitions. Journal of Business Ethics, 9, 313-352. doi: 10.1007/ s10892-005-3508-y. · DOI
- Thomson, J. J. (1985). The Trolley Problem. The Yale Law Journal, 94(6), 1395-1415.
- Tversky, A. & Kahneman, D. (1974). Judgement under uncertainty: heuristics and biases. Science. New Series, 185(4157), 1124-1131.
- Authors
- Rehman, S., & Dzionek‑Kozłowska, J.
- Affiliations
- The University of Texas Rio Grande Valley (US)
- ORCID
- Rehman, Sharaf
- Venue
- Annales. Etyka w Życiu Gospodarczym
- Published
- 2018-12-21
- Volume
- 21
- Issue
- 3
- ISSN
- 2353-4869 (ISSN-L)
- 1899-2226
- OpenAlex
- W2914227416
- Cited by
- 8
- References
- 17
- Citations by year
- 2025: 1 · 2024: 2 · 2023: 2 · 2021: 1 · 2020: 1 · 2019: 1
- FWCI
- 0.45
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- diamond
- doi.org
- Licence
- Locations
- Annales Etyka w życiu gospodarczym (publishedVersion, cc-by-nc-nd)
- ScholarWorks @ UTRGV (The University of Texas Rio Grande Valley) (submittedVersion)
- DOAJ (DOAJ: Directory of Open Access Journals) (submittedVersion)
- University of Lodz Repository (University of Łódź) (submittedVersion, cc-by-nc-nd)
- Topics
- Life Sciences › Neuroscience › Cognitive Neuroscience › Psychology of Moral and Emotional Judgment
- Social Sciences › Decision Sciences › General Decision Sciences › Decision-Making and Behavioral Economics
- Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Philosophical Ethics and Theory
- Keywords
- trolley problem, ethical decision-making, utilitarianism, deontology, rational choice theory, gender differences, age differences, ethical dilemmas, hypothetical scenarios
About these checks
Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.
Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.
Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.
What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›
Are you an author, or do you see a problem with this page? Request a review
