The DOI matches its Crossref record; 9 of the 9 references it cites were found in a registry or an index; none of the 43 sources its claims cite is checked for support yet.
Emerging Maritime Threats in Global Geopolitics: GPS Spoofing as a Tool of Hybrid Warfare in Strategic Maritime Chokepoints
Open accessAbstract
This research examines the operational deployment of GPS spoofing as an emerging threat to maritime security, analyzing critical incidents in strategically vital waterways that demonstrate sophisticated electronic warfare capabilities against commercial shipping. Through detailed case study analysis of the May 2025 MSC ANTONIA grounding in the Red Sea and the 2019 Stena Impero seizure in the Strait of Hormuz, this paper reveals how GPS spoofing has evolved from theoretical vulnerability to operational weapon within hybrid warfare strategies. The research identifies systematic campaigns employing sophisticated spoofing techniques that gradually manipulate vessel positioning while maintaining apparent signal integrity, making detection extremely challenging. Evidence indicates state-level involvement through proxy forces, particularly in regions of strategic importance, utilizing advanced electronic warfare capabilities that exceed typical non-state actor resources. The study reveals critical vulnerabilities in modern maritime navigation systems, including excessive GPS dependence, inadequate spoofing detection capabilities, and insufficient crew training for electronic warfare scenarios. Strategic implications encompass disruption of critical maritime chokepoints, erosion of trust in fundamental navigation systems, and escalation potential threatening global trade flows. The paper proposes comprehensive countermeasures encompassing technical solutions, procedural improvements, enhanced training requirements, and regulatory reforms to address this evolving threat to maritime security and international commerce.
Overview
CoChat Summary
TL;DR
This paper argues that GPS spoofing has moved from a theoretical vulnerability to an operational weapon in hybrid warfare against commercial shipping, using the May 2025 MSC ANTONIA grounding and the 2019 Stena Impero seizure as primary cases. It identifies state-level/proxy involvement, systemic navigation vulnerabilities, and proposes technical, procedural, training, and regulatory countermeasures.
Key findings
- GPS spoofing is presented as a systematic, state-linked threat in strategic maritime chokepoints, with documented cases including the May 10, 2025, grounding of the 7,000 TEU MSC ANTONIA near Eliza Shoals south of Jeddah and the July 19, 2019, seizure of the Stena Impero in the Strait of Hormuz.
- Windward data show the average distance vessels “jump” when AIS is jammed grew from 600 km in Q4 2024 to 6,300 km in Q1 2025, and more than 180 vessels were affected in the Red Sea area near Sudan in Q1 2025 alone; the paper describes a ten-fold increase in spoofing range/effectiveness between late 2024 and early 2025.
- The paper reports critical vulnerabilities: excessive GNSS dependence without cross-verification, inadequate spoofing detection, and insufficient crew training; it contrasts this with aviation’s multi-layered navigation redundancy and training.
- Proposed countermeasures include multi-constellation GNSS receivers, anti-spoofing receivers, eLoran as a terrestrial backup (described as approximately one million times stronger than GPS signals), INS integration, enhanced STCW training, and IMO/SOLAS/ISPS regulatory reforms.
Methods
- Qualitative case study methodology combining incident analysis, technical assessment, and geopolitical evaluation, with two primary cases selected: the 2025 MSC ANTONIA incident and the 2019 Stena Impero seizure.
- Data were drawn from publicly available open sources, including AIS vessel tracking and analyses from Windward, MarineTraffic, Pole Star Global, and Lloyd’s List Intelligence, plus MARAD advisories, UKMTO reports, IMO circular MSC.1/Circ.1644, and academic literature.
- Analysis integrated technical, operational, and strategic dimensions, using multiple-source triangulation and cross-theater comparison with documented interference in the Baltic Sea, Red Sea, and Persian Gulf.
Limitations
- The paper states limitations including restricted access to classified intelligence assessments, limited detailed technical data from affected vessels due to commercial sensitivity, temporal constraints limiting follow-up on long-term impacts, and the rapidly evolving nature of electronic warfare meaning technical assessments may not capture the most recent spoofing methodologies.
- Evident from the text: the study relies on a qualitative two-case primary design and open-source/publicly available data, with attribution remaining challenging in some regions such as Chinese coastal waters due to multiple potential sources.
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Integrity signals
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Verification
Claims the paper makes
0 Valid · 11 Not valid · 42 Not checked · 75 Own results and interpretations
A result the paper states — it cites no source for it, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“Analysis reveals signi cant escalation in GPS spoo ng capabilities and impacts over recent years.”
§ Emerging Maritime Threats in Global Geopolitics: GPS Spoo ng as a Tool of Hybrid Warfare in Strategic Maritime Chokepoints > 3.1.1 GPS Spoo ng Methodologies and Escalation
plainstates an association- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: passes — The paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
A check of a cited source is scheduled, or we don’t hold its full text yet; the claim is checked once it runs.
In the paper
“In the Black Sea, vessels have reported GPS systems showing positions miles inland (Graham, 2011; Maritime GNSS Interference Worldwide: A Cumulative Analysis 2025 | GPSPATRON.Com, n.d.), demonstrating the geographic scope of the phenomenon.”
§ Emerging Maritime Threats in Global Geopolitics: GPS Spoo ng as a Tool of Hybrid Warfare in Strategic Maritime Chokepoints > 3.2.3 Additional Documented Incidents
What the sources say
- Not checked yetcites Graham, 2011 source
A check is scheduled.
- Not matchedcites Maritime GNSS Interference Worldwide: A Cumulative Analysis 2025 | GPSPATRON.Com, n.d.
Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.
boosted- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: unclear — It is unclear whether the paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
- Not checked yet
In the paper
“Electronic warfare support (ES)-involving actions taken to detect, intercept, identify, locate, and localize sources of electromagnetic energy-is virtually absent in civilian maritime operations (Beckman et al., 2025).”
§ Emerging Maritime Threats in Global Geopolitics: GPS Spoo ng as a Tool of Hybrid Warfare in Strategic Maritime Chokepoints > 4.4 Systemic Vulnerabilities and Detection Challenges
What the sources say
- Not matchedcites Beckman et al., 2025
Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.
plain- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: passes — The paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
- Not matched
None of the sources cited for this claim have been checked yet.
In the paper
“Maritime intelligence rms quickly identi ed GPS spoo ng as the probable cause of the grounding.”
§ Emerging Maritime Threats in Global Geopolitics: GPS Spoo ng as a Tool of Hybrid Warfare in Strategic Maritime Chokepoints > 3.1.2 Sophisticated Attack Methodologies
hedgedstates a causeSingle case- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: unclear — It is unclear whether the paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
A result the paper states — it cites no source for it, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“The research identi es systematic campaigns employing sophisticated spoo ng techniques that gradually manipulate vessel positioning while maintaining apparent signal integrity, making detection extremely challenging.”
§ Emerging Maritime Threats in Global Geopolitics: GPS Spoo ng as a Tool of Hybrid Warfare in Strategic Maritime Chokepoints > Abstract
plainstates a cause- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: passes — The paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
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Citations
Cites
Spezio, A. E. (2002) · IEEE Transactions on Microwave Theory and Techniques · doi:10.1109/22.989948 · Cited by 284
High-accuracy inertial measurements with cold-atom sensors
Geiger, R., Landragin, A., Merlet, S., & Pereira Dos Santos, F. (2020) · AVS Quantum Science · doi:10.1116/5.0009093 · Cited by 215
Recent advances on jamming and spoofing detection in GNSS
Radoš, K., Brkić, M., & Begušić, D. (2024) · Sensors · doi:10.3390/s24134210 · Cited by 154
Introduction to Electronic Warfare Modeling and Simulation
Adamy, D. L. (2006) · Institution of Engineering and Technology eBooks · doi:10.1049/sbra011e · Cited by 107
Assessing cyber challenges of maritime navigation
Androjna, A., Brcko, T., Pavic, I., & Greidanus, H. (2020) · Journal of Marine Science and Engineering · doi:10.3390/jmse8100776 · Cited by 101
A research design for generalizing from multiple case studies
Greene, D., & David, J. L. (1984) · Evaluation and Program Planning · doi:10.1016/0149-7189(84)90027-2 · Cited by 61
Communications, Radar and Electronic Warfare
Graham, A. (2011) · doi:10.1002/9780470977170 · Cited by 51
Risks and threats in the 21st century maritime security
Tsailas, D. (2025) · Security science journal · doi:10.37458/ssj.6.1.7 · Cited by 6
Cybersecurity in Maritime Transport Systems: Threats, Trends, and Countermeasures in the Last Decade
Cichocki, R., & Wojcik, P. (2025) · TransNav, the International Journal on Marine Navigation and Safety of Sea Transportation · doi:10.12716/1001.19.03.03 · Cited by 4
Research works printed but not linked: 11
- Grant PM, Collins JH (1982) Introduction to electronic warfare. In: IEE Proceedings F (Communications, Radar and Signal Processing). IET; pp. 113–32
- Hoffman FG (2014) Hybrid warfare and challenges. Strategic studies. Routledge, pp 329–337
- Hunter E, Pernik P (2015) The challenges of hybrid warfare. JSTOR
- Deitchman SJ (2008) The Electronic Battlefield in the Vietnam War. J Mil Hist 72(3):869–887
- Follath E, Stark H (2009) How Israel Destroyed Syria’s Al Kibar Nuclear Reactor. Spiegel Online 11:22–26
- Willett M (2023) The cyber dimension of the Russia–Ukraine war. Survival: October-November 2022. Routledge, pp 7–26
- Solli PE (2024) Differentiating Hybrid Threats against the High North and Baltic Sea regions. JSTOR
- Adamy DL (2015) EW 104: electronic warfare against a new generation of threats. Artech House
- Zorri DM, Kessler GC (2024) Position, navigation, and timing weaponization in the maritime domain: Orientation in the era of great systems conflict. Joint Force Q 112(1):3
- Beckman J, Carter CM, Diebold MC, Ghaffari R, Lonstein W, Malhotra V et al (2025) Connected, Complex, Compromised (Murthy & Ghaffari). MARITIME TRANSPORTATION SYSTEMS
- United Nations (1982) United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). United Nations
Cited by
Still being checked.
Metadata
- Authors
- Rodriguez-Diaz, E., Santamaria, M., Prieto, J. M., & Alcaide, J. I.
- Affiliations
- Universidad de Cádiz (ES)
- Corresponding author
- Rodriguez-Diaz, Emilio
- Venue
- Research Square
- Published
- 2026-03-19
- OpenAlex
- W7139040661
- Cited by
- 0
- References
- 9
- Type
- posted content
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
- doi.org
- Locations
- Research Square (submittedVersion, cc-by)
- Topics
- Physical Sciences › Engineering › Aerospace Engineering › GNSS positioning and interference
- Social Sciences › Political Science and International Relations › Maritime Security and History
- Physical Sciences › Engineering › Aerospace Engineering › Military Technology and Strategies
- Keywords
- GPS spoofing, hybrid warfare, maritime security, maritime chokepoints, electronic warfare, merchant shipping, Strait of Hormuz, Red Sea, anti-spoofing, countermeasures, international trade disruption
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- CoChat. (2026). Citation check: Emerging Maritime Threats in Global Geopolitics: GPS Spoofing as a Tool of Hybrid Warfare in Strategic Maritime Chokepoints. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.21203/rs.3.rs-8901159/v1
- The paper
- Rodriguez-Diaz, E., Santamaria, M., Prieto, J. M., & Alcaide, J. I. (2026). Emerging Maritime Threats in Global Geopolitics: GPS Spoofing as a Tool of Hybrid Warfare in Strategic Maritime Chokepoints. Research Square. https://doi.org/10.21203/rs.3.rs-8901159/v1
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