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Liquidity Hoarding and Interbank Market Spreads: The Role of Counterparty Risk
Open accessAbstract
We study the functioning and possible breakdown of the interbank market due to asymmetric information about counterparty risk. We allow for privately observed shocks to the distribution of asset risk across banks after the initial portfolio of liquid and illiquid investments is chosen. Our model generates several interbank market regimes: 1) low interest rate spread and full participation; 2) elevated spread and adverse selection; and 3) liquidity hoarding leading to a market breakdown. The regimes are in line with observed developments in the interbank market before and during the 2007-09 nancial crisis. We use the model to discuss various policy responses. JEL classification: G01, G21, D82 Keywords: Financial crisis; Interbank market; Liquidity; Asymmetric information We thank Gaetano Antinol , Patrick Bolton, Charles Calomiris, Elena Carletti, Nuno Cassola, V.V. Chari, Doug Diamond, Mathias Drehmann, Philipp Hartmann, Antoine Martin, Enrico Perotti, Tano Santos, and seminar participants at Columbia, Wharton, the FRB Philadelphia, the FRB New York (Conference on Central Bank Liquidity Tools), Amsterdam Business School (Workshop on Incentive Compatible Regulation), the 2008 UniCredit Conference on Banking and Finance (Vienna), the 2nd Swiss Banking Conference (Hasliberg), the ESMT, Sveriges Riksbank and the European Central Bank for helpful comments. Marco Lo Duca provided excellent research assistance. The views expressed do not necessarily reect those of the European Central Bank or the Eurosystem. yAll authors are at the European Central Bank, Financial Research Division, Kaiserstrasse 29, D-60311 Frankfurt, email: rstname.lastname@ecb.int Neither the recent massive money injections, the coordinated lowering of interest rates nor the use of public funds to recapitalize banks have done much to restart interbank lending. This action did not solve the underlying problem preventing interbank lending: extreme information asymmetry. Financial Times, November 9, 2008
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Corporate financing and investment decisions when firms have information that investors do not have
Myers, S. C., & Majluf, N. S. (1984) · Journal of Financial Economics · doi:10.1016/0304-405x(84)90023-0 · Cited by 18,957
Credit Rationing in Markets with Imperfect Information
Stiglitz, J. E., & Weiss, A. (1981) · Columbia University · doi:10.7916/d8v12ft1 · Cited by 12,769
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Metadata
- Authors
- Heider, F., Hoerova, M., & Holthausen, C.
- Venue
- SSRN Electronic Journal
- Publisher
- Elsevier BV
- Published
- 2009
- ISSN
- 1556-5068 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W1929539829
- Cited by
- 251
- References
- 2
- Type
- posted content
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
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