A Theory of Reciprocity
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This paper presents a formal theory of reciprocity. Reciprocity means that people reward kind actions and punish unkind ones. The theory takes into account that people evaluate the kindness of an action not only by its consequences but also by the intention underlying this action. The theory explains the relevant stylized facts of a wide range of experimental games. Among them are the ultimatum game, the gift-exchange game, a reduced best-shot game, the dictator game, the prisoner's dilemma, and public goods games. Furthermore, the theory explains why the same consequences trigger different reciprocal responses in different environments Finally the theory explains why in bilaterial interactions outcomes tend to be "fair" whereas in competitive markets even extremely unfair distributions may arise.
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A social planner could offer recipients investments that are proportional to their past reciprocation, so that self-interested agents are encouraged to reciprocate in expectation of future receipt.
“At the other extreme, a social planner could offer recipients investments that are proportional to their past reciprocation, so that self-interested agents are encouraged to reciprocate in expectation of future receipt29.”
From Deep reinforcement learning can promote sustainable human behaviour in a common-pool resource problem (2025) · cites this paper as [29]
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References 42 · Cited by 293
- Authors
- Falk, A., & Fischbacher, U.
- Affiliations
- University of Bonn (DE)
- University of Konstanz (DE)
- Corresponding author
- Falk, Armin
- Venue
- SSRN Electronic Journal
- Publisher
- Elsevier BV
- Published
- 2000
- ISSN
- 1556-5068 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W2041701600
- Cited by
- 293
- References
- 42
- Citations by year
- 2025: 1 · 2024: 2 · 2022: 2 · 2020: 1 · 2019: 18 · 2018: 4 · 2017: 6 · 2016: 16 · 2015: 15 · 2014: 23 · 2013: 14 · 2012: 18
- Type
- posted content
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
- doi.org
- Locations
- SSRN Electronic Journal (acceptedVersion)
- Zurich Open Repository and Archive (University of Zurich) (submittedVersion, other-oa)
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Safety Research › Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies
- Social Sciences › Sociology and Political Science › Evolutionary Game Theory and Cooperation
- Social Sciences › Economics, Econometrics and Finance › Economics and Econometrics › Game Theory and Voting Systems
- Keywords
- reciprocity, ultimatum game, gift-exchange game, dictator game, prisoner's dilemma, public goods game, fairness, bilateral interaction, competitive markets, experimental games
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