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The Government Takeover of the U.S. Telephone System During World War I

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Janson, Michael, Yoo, Christopher S. · 2012 · SSRN Electronic Journal

The DOI matches its Crossref record, with a small difference in title or year; 33 of the 33 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.

Abstract

One of the most distinctive characteristics of the U.S. telephone system is that it has always been privately owned, in stark contrast to the pattern of government ownership followed by virtually every other nation. What is not widely known is how close the United States came to falling in line with the rest of the world. For the one-year period following July 31, 1918, the exigencies of World War I led the federal government to take over the U.S. telephone system. A close examination of this episode sheds new light into a number of current policy issues. The history confirms that natural monopoly was not solely responsible for AT&T’s return to dominance and reveals that the Kingsbury Commitment was more effective in deterring monopoly than generally believed. Instead, a significant force driving the re-monopolization of the telephone system was the U.S. Postmaster General, Albert Burleson —not Theodore Vail, President of AT&T. It also demonstrates that universal service was the result of government-imposed emulation of the postal system, not, as some have claimed, a post hoc rationalization for maintaining monopoly. The most remarkable question is, having once obtained control over the telephone system, why did the federal government ever let it go? The dynamics surrounding this decision reveal the inherent limits of relying on war to justify extraordinary actions. More importantly, it shows the difficulties that governments face in overseeing industries that are undergoing dynamic technological change and that require significant capital investments.

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Crossref · 10.2139/ssrn.2033124

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33 of 33 references verified0 citation errors · 0 not checkable

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Citations

Cites

Show all 33 references

Research works printed but not linked: 44

  1. Rowland, 10.1016/s0959-3780(03)00021-9 · DOI
  2. 1919, reporting debate over the government's authority to control the wire systems and change rates)
  3. 235 (1919) (attacking the government's "experiment[ing] at the expense of the public" by seizing the wires and reporting widespread opposition to the same), Representative Aswell Apologizes, 43 AM, 235
  4. Office, 1919, ASB, Box 24. 408. Id. 409. Id. 410. Id. 411. BROOKS, supra note 16, 158
  5. A History, 1975, THE EARLY YEARS (1875-1925), 611
  6. Robert J Chapuis, 1982, 100 YEARS OF TELEPHONE SWITCHING (1878-1978)
  7. Supra Mueller, 36-37; see also Weiman & Levin, supra note 142, 10
  8. E G, 1923, Telephone companies . . . show no signs of economy with increased size, but rather the opposite, STUDIES IN THE ECONOMICS OF OVERHEAD COSTS, 321
  9. city grows it is necessary to install a larger and larger number of central offices because a girl's arm is just so long, and as the manual switchboards are constructed she can only reach about 10,000 stations with her arm
  10. See Return of the Wire Systems Hearings, supra note 202
  11. Id, 1916, The difficulty is that the larger the number of units you serve in the telephone business, under conditions that exist requiring a larger and larger investment per unit, a larger and larger operating cost per unit, that larger investment and larger cost goes up so fast that the larger the number of units you serve, the more it costs per unit to serve them, Interstate Commerce Comm'n on Tel. Cos. & Tel. Cos. Reporting to the Interstate Commerce Comm'n for the Calendar Year
  12. Douglas Galbi, Telephone Industry Data, GALBITHINK.ORG
  13. See Langdale, supra note 449
  14. See Roger, 1989, The Anticompetitive Uses of Regulation: United States v. AT&T, in THE ANTITRUST REVOLUTION, 290
  15. See Robert Macdougall, 2003, The People's Telephone: The Political Culture of Independent Telephony, 1 BUS, ECON. HIST. ONLINE, 1
  16. Mueller See, more than 5 percent of all telephone calls were to points more than fifty miles away" and that "the real source of competitive advantage was comprehensive coverage of a particular region corresponding to the interest of the majority of telephone users, 10, 72
  17. See Id, at 73 (noting that prior to 1894 Bell pursued the long-distance market "to the exclusion of most others" and that, 73
  18. See MacDougall, supra note 462, at 11-12 (arguing that AT&T "regarded its long lines as a major competitive weapon
  19. See supra note 162 and accompanying text
  20. See supra notes 163-64 and accompanying text
  21. See supra note 163 and accompanying text. 482. See supra Figure 2
  22. Mueller See, supra note 10, at 55-60 (discussing phases of expansion employed by independents)
  23. U L Nw, 2010, 641, 666
  24. 1915, Letter from H.D. Critchfield, Sales Dep't, Automatic Electric Co, 17
  25. ; Charles A, 1989, ); see also H.R. Doc. No. 340, 76th Cong., 1st Sess. (1939) (noting that the Kingsbury Commitment was generally understood to repent acquisition of competing telephone companies until after January 1918, when it became generally understood that it was not a violation of The Kingsbury Commitment for the Bell System to acquire competing telephone stations, if at the same time the Bell System
  26. Rec Cong, 1921, The bill was brought to the attention of the committee by . . . the so-called independent telephone companies of the United States
  27. Gabel, T]he independents joined Bell in seeking passage of the Willis-Graham Act of 1921, which permitted the merger or consolidation of competing telephone companies
  28. Robinson, T]he independents joined AT&T in supporting a lifting of restrictions on AT&T acquisitions
  29. Supra Mueller, 10, 140, 10.7863/jum.1984.3.7.r77 · DOI
  30. Weiman & Levin, See supra notes 465-73 and accompanying text. 493. STONE, supra note 3, 142
  31. B The, 1939, 500 Critics of this position suggest that the concept of universal service is more modern, being the product of AT&T's attempt to justify the continuation of its monopoly when facing the emergence of competition during the 1960s and 1970s. 501 Richard John has offered an intriguing third interpretation, arguing that universal service represents Theodore Vail's attempt to emulate the postal system, influenced by his experience running the Railway Mail System in between his stints at AT&T. 502 There can be no question that AT&T endorsed the idea of providing telephone service to all Americans. For example, its 1907 Annual Report intoned that the "'universality'" that was the Bell System's strength "carries with it . . . the obligation to occupy and develop the whole field," including semi-urban and rural areas as well as urban areas. 503 Its 1910 Annual Report affirmed the company's "belie[f] that some sort of connection with the telephone system should be within the reach of all" and that the telephone network would ultimately become a medium for all electronic 499. Only a handful of works acknowledge Burleson's role, and those that do offer no more than a few words, Origins of Universal Service A vibrant debate has emerged over the origins of universal service, 340
  32. Supra Fischer, at 50 (devoting a single sentence to how "the wartime experience of coordination between AT&T and the independents accelerated the unification of the industry, 15
  33. A L Huber Et, During World War I, from 1918 to 1919, the Postmaster General took over operation of the telephone industry and . . . directed the competing local systems to consolidate into a single national network
  34. Supra Mueller, at 133 (making a passing reference to "World War I-induced centralization, 10
  35. Supra Vietor, (devoting a single sentence to how government control "ran squarely up against the Justice Department's prohibition on consolidation of competing exchanges, 16, 172
  36. Peters, at 257 (noting Burleson's view that "government operation and control of the telephone system 'would undoubtedly cause the coordination and consolidation of competing systems wherever possible
  37. At&t Co, 1909, ANNUAL REPORT OF THE DIRECTORS OF AT&T COMPANY TO THE STOCKHOLDERS FOR THE YEAR ENDING DECEMBER 31
  38. Robert W Mueller, 2000, explaining that although the phrase was first used by Theodore Vail, the company "revived the notion of universal service, 10, 6
  39. Supra At&t, Id. at 23. 505. MUELLER, supra note 10, at 100. 506. Id. at 101-03. 507. Id. at 151-52. 508. Id. at 151-55. 509. Id. at 159. 510. Id. at 160-61. 511. Thierer, supra note 16, 276
  40. Supra John, 1930, The proper regulation of rates can be had only by maintaining the limits of state and federal jurisdiction, 379, 387. 547. Id. 548. Id. at 590. 549. 282 U.S, 17
  41. N C Util, 1976, Comm'n v. FCC, 537 F.2d 787, 793 n.6 (4th Cir
  42. Matthew S Bewig, 1991, Federalism and Telecommunications: On the Right Wavelength?, 1194
  43. Richard Mckenna, 1985, Preemption Under The Communications Act, 37 FED, COMM. L.J, 1, 13
  44. See supra note 197 and accompanying text

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Metadata

Authors
Janson, M., & Yoo, C. S.
Affiliations
University of Pennsylvania (US)
Corresponding author
Yoo, Christopher S.
Venue
SSRN Electronic Journal
Publisher
Elsevier BV
Published
2012
ISSN
1556-5068 (ISSN-L)
OpenAlex
W1567778845
Cited by
1
References
31
Citations by year
2020: 1
Type
posted content
Language
en
Open access
Locations
SSRN Electronic Journal (publishedVersion)
Topics
  • Social Sciences › Economics, Econometrics and Finance › Economics and Econometrics › ICT Impact and Policies
  • Social Sciences › Economics, Econometrics and Finance › Economics and Econometrics › Merger and Competition Analysis
  • Social Sciences › Economics, Econometrics and Finance › Economics and Econometrics › Legal and Constitutional Studies
Keywords
World War I, AT&T, natural monopoly, universal service, telephone regulation, telecommunications policy

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Janson, M., & Yoo, C. S. (2012). The Government Takeover of the U.S. Telephone System During World War I. SSRN Electronic Journal. https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2033124

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