Privacy and Personal Data Collection with Information Externalities
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Many companies are incentivised to gather and monetise extensive amounts of user data, often concealing the scope of these practices behind dense, difficult-to-read privacy policies.
“Many companies are incentivised to gather and monetise extensive amounts of user data 31 , often concealing the scope of these practices behind dense, difficult-to-read privacy policies 32,33 .”
From Privacy in consumer wearable technologies: a living systematic analysis of data policies across leading manufacturers (2025) · cites this paper as [31]
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Big Data and Competition Policy
Stucke, M., & Grunes, A. (2016) · doi:10.1093/law:ocl/9780198788133.001.0001 · Cited by 181 · see citing works
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Research works printed but not linked: 22
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- MacCarthy, M. (2011). New directions in privacy: Disclosure, unfairness and externalities. I/S: A Journal of Law and Policy for the Information Society 6, 425-512.
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- Posner, R. A. (1978). The right of privacy. Georgia Law Review 12(3), 393-422.
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Sorted by citations
Doherty, C., Baldwin, M., Lambe, R., Altini, M., & Caulfield, B. (2025) · npj Digital Medicine · doi:10.1038/s41746-025-01757-1 · Cited by 55 · see citing works
- Authors
- Choi, J. P., Jeon, D.-S., & Kim, B.-C.
- Venue
- SSRN Electronic Journal
- Publisher
- Elsevier BV
- Published
- 2018
- ISSN
- 1556-5068
- Cited by
- 2
- References
- 1
- Language
- en
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