Theory Is All You Need: AI, Human Cognition, and Causal Reasoning
Open accessPreprint — published as 10.1287/stsc.2024.0189
Abstract
Scholars argue that artificial intelligence (AI) can generate genuine novelty and new knowledge and, in turn, that AI and computational models of cognition will replace human decision making under uncertainty. We disagree. We argue that AI’s data-based prediction is different from human theory-based causal logic and reasoning. We highlight problems with the decades-old analogy between computers and minds as input–output devices, using large language models as an example. Human cognition is better conceptualized as a form of theory-based causal reasoning rather than AI’s emphasis on information processing and data-based prediction. AI uses a probability-based approach to knowledge and is largely backward looking and imitative, whereas human cognition is forward-looking and capable of generating genuine novelty. We introduce the idea of data–belief asymmetries to highlight the difference between AI and human cognition, using the example of heavier-than-air flight to illustrate our arguments. Theory-based causal reasoning provides a cognitive mechanism for humans to intervene in the world and to engage in directed experimentation to generate new data. Throughout the article, we discuss the implications of our argument for understanding the origins of novelty, new knowledge, and decision making under uncertainty.
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References 174 · Cited by 152
- Authors
- Felin, T., & Holweg, M.
- Affiliations
- Utah State University (US)
- University of Oxford (GB)
- Corresponding author
- Felin, Teppo
- Venue
- Strategy Science
- Publisher
- Elsevier BV
- Published
- 2024
- Volume
- 9
- Issue
- 4
- Pages
- 346-371
- ISSN
- 2333-2050 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W4404964023
- Cited by
- 152
- References
- 174
- Citations by year
- 2026: 84 · 2025: 59 · 2024: 9
- FWCI
- 22.38
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
- doi.org
- Locations
- Strategy Science (publishedVersion, public-domain)
- SSRN Electronic Journal (acceptedVersion)
- Topics
- Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Artificial Intelligence › Artificial Intelligence Applications
- Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Artificial Intelligence › Logic, Reasoning, and Knowledge
- Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Artificial Intelligence › AI-based Problem Solving and Planning
- Keywords
- artificial intelligence, human cognition, causal reasoning, large language models, novelty generation, new knowledge, decision making under uncertainty, cognitive modeling, origin of knowledge, heavier-than-air flight
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