The DOI matches its Crossref record; 5 of the 5 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Note on non-cooperative convex game
Open accessAbstract
ISODA 1. Introduction.Nash's equilibrium-point theorem for many-person games can be approached by two methods: first, the Kakutani-type fixed-point theorem 1 is very useful for this game problem; second, in case of finite-dimensional multilinear payoffs, J. Nash himself has given an elegant procedure [7] which is directly based on Brouwer's fixedpoint theorem.In a previous paper [10] one of us proved a general minimax theorem in making use of a procedure analogous to that of Nash.The present note is a continuation of this paper, and its main purpose is to offer further improvements of Nash's method so as to treat noncooperative many-person games played over infinite-dimensional convex sets, based on a generalization of von Neumann's symmetrization method 2 of game matrices.The results thus obtained contain further weakening of (especially topological) assumptions of the equilibriumpoint theorem.Next we shall discuss the equilibrium-point problem of some general noncooperative games by reducing them to suitable convex games.This will clarify the relevance of convex games to general games. Definitions and notations* We mean by a convex game[3] a noncooperative ^-person game with the following conditions: a) The ith player's strategy space is a compact convex set Xt of a topological linear space E. t .b) The ith player's payoff Ki(x l9 •••,#*,•••,#") is concave with respect to his own strategy variable XιeX t .c) The sum of payoffs ^^K t (x u •• ,# i , •••,#") is continuous over the cartesian product space X x ®X t ® *®X n .d) For each fixed x 49 Ki(x l9 , Xιlf x if x ί+ ι, ••-,#«) is a continuous
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Citations
Cites
Nash, J. (1989) · Cournot Oligopoly · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511528231.007 · Cited by 5,595
Theory of Games and Economic Behavior
N., E., von Neumann, J., & Morgenstern, O. (1945) · The Journal of Philosophy · doi:10.2307/2019327 · Cited by 4,006
Theory of Games and Economic Behavior
ROWLAND, E. (1946) · Nature · doi:10.1038/157172a0 · Cited by 3,280
A generalization of Brouwer’s fixed point theorem
Kakutani, S. (1941) · Duke Mathematical Journal · doi:10.1215/s0012-7094-41-00838-4 · Cited by 1,213
Harris, T. E. (1955) · Pacific Journal of Mathematics · doi:10.2140/pjm.1955.5.707 · Cited by 119
Cited by
Generalized Nash equilibrium problems
Facchinei, F., & Kanzow, C. (2007) · 4OR · doi:10.1007/s10288-007-0054-4 · Cited by 591
Numerical Solutions to Nash–Cournot Equilibria in Coupled Constraint Electricity Markets
Contreras, J., Klusch, M., & Krawczyk, J. B. (2004) · IEEE Transactions on Power Systems · doi:10.1109/tpwrs.2003.820692 · Cited by 287
Yuan, H., Yu, K., Xie, F., Liu, M., & Sun, S. (2024) · Medicine Advances · doi:10.1002/med4.75 · Cited by 61
Metadata
- Authors
- Nikaidô, H., & Isoda, K.
- Venue
- Pacific Journal of Mathematics
- Publisher
- Mathematical Sciences Publishers
- Published
- 1955-12-01
- Volume
- 5
- Issue
- 5
- Pages
- 807-815
- ISSN
- 0030-8730 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W2052236418
- Cited by
- 429
- References
- 5
- FWCI
- 11.82
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- bronze
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