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Cited by 41Flood Risk Assessment and ManagementDam Engineering and SafetyDisaster Management and Resilience

The DOI matches its Crossref record; 12 of the 12 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.

Interaction between the US Army Corps of Engineers and the Orleans Levee Board preceding the drainage canal wall failures and catastrophic flooding of New Orleans in 2005

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Rogers, J. David, Kemp, G. Paul, Bosworth, H. J., Seed, Raymond B.·2015·Water Policy
DOI 10.2166/wp.2015.077
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Abstract

The authors hope to correct any premature conclusions about the role of the pre-Katrina Orleans Levee Board (OLB) in the failure of the outfall drainage canals in New Orleans during the 2005 hurricane – conclusions that appear to have been based on inaccurate information and/or assumptions. With regard to the 17th Street and London Avenue Canals, the authors have not uncovered any information that would suggest that the OLB behaved irresponsibly in its duties. What is evident from the project record is that the Army Corps of Engineers recommended raising the canal floodwalls for the 17th Street Canal, but recommended gated structures at the mouths of the Orleans and London Avenue Canals because the latter plan was less expensive. The OLB convinced Congress to pass legislation that required the Corps to raise the floodwalls for all three canals. Furthermore, the Corps, in a separate attempt to limit project costs, initiated a sheet pile load test (E-99 Study), but misinterpreted the results and wrongly concluded that sheet piles needed to be driven to depths of only 17 feet (1 foot = 0.3048 meters) instead of between 31 and 46 feet. That decision saved approximately US$100 million, but significantly reduced overall engineering reliability.

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Crossref · 10.2166/wp.2015.077

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Show all 12 references

Research works printed but not linked: 9

  1. Anderson, 2007, The New Orleans Hurricane Protection System: What Went Wrong and Why: A Report by the American Society of Civil Engineers External Review Panel
  2. Board of Commissioners of the Orleans Levee District, 1990, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers’ Hurricane-Flood Protection Project Lake Pontchartrain and Vicinity, LA – London Avenue Canal and Orleans Avenue Canal Work
  3. Engineer Regulations, 1996, Flood Control Operations and Maintenance Policies
  4. Fatherree, 2006, The History of Geotechnical Engineering at the Waterways Experiment Station, 1932–2000
  5. Interagency Performance Evaluation Task Force (IPET), 2006, Performance Evaluation of the New Orleans and Southeast Louisiana Hurricane Protection System.
  6. Lansden, 1990, Minutes of the Monthly Board Meeting, 7 November 1990
  7. Lansden, 1991, Minutes of the Monthly Board Meeting, 30 May 1991
  8. Mittal, 2005, Lake Pontchartrain and Vicinity Hurricane Protection Project
  9. Rawls S. Hudson D. (2006). Selected Third-party Bad Faith Liability Standards Governing Failure to Settle Cases. Mealey's Litigation Report: Insurance Bad Faith, Vol. 20, #4.

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Metadata

Authors
Rogers, J. D., Kemp, G. P., Bosworth, H. J., & Seed, R. B.
Affiliations
  • Missouri University of Science and Technology (US)
  • 633 Magnolia Wood Avenue, Baton Rouge, LA 70808, USA
  • 1527 S. Carrollton Avenue, New Orleans, LA 70118, USA
  • University of California, Berkeley (US)
Corresponding author
Bosworth, H. J.
ORCID
Venue
Water Policy
Publisher
IWA Publishing
Published
2015-03-06
Volume
17
Issue
4
Pages
707-723
ISSN
  • 1366-7017 (ISSN-L)
  • 1996-9759
DOI
10.2166/wp.2015.077
OpenAlex
W2267780081
Semantic Scholar
c3cbdb85775180faeba6ac881a7102844c969cc9
Cited by
41
References
12
Citations by year
2025: 1 · 2024: 1 · 2023: 1 · 2021: 1 · 2020: 2 · 2019: 28 · 2018: 1 · 2017: 4 · 2016: 1 · 2015: 1
FWCI
1.32
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
Licence
Locations
Water Policy (publishedVersion, cc-by-nc-nd)
Funders
  • Louisiana Department of Transportation and Development
  • Australian Government
  • U.S. Army Corps of Engineers
Topics
  • Physical Sciences › Environmental Science › Global and Planetary Change › Flood Risk Assessment and Management
  • Physical Sciences › Engineering › Civil and Structural Engineering › Dam Engineering and Safety
  • Social Sciences › Sociology and Political Science › Disaster Management and Resilience
Keywords
U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, reliability engineering, congressional legislation

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