Relative Bargaining Power, Corporate Restructuring, and Managerial Incentives
The DOI matches its Crossref record; 1 of the 1 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
Using longitudinal personnel data from a U.S. Fortune 500 manufacturing firm for the period of 1967 to 1993, I assess the effects of corporate restructuring and power differences between a firm and its managers on the nature and use of different incentives. I extend relative bargaining power theory to predict that a firm's ability to provide incentives in the ways it prefers—bonuses instead of increases to base salary or promotions—varies due to differences over time in monitoring and sanctions stemming from organizational change processes. Findings are consistent with the theory and show a negative effect of bonuses on salary increases and of bonuses on promotions, with tradeoffs greatest when the firm's oversight of rewards was highest and termination threats were most explicit. Further support for the theory is the finding that the strength of the negative effect of bonuses on promotions varied across managerial groups due to differences in managers' bargaining power: “fast-trackers” were much less likely to experience a tradeoff than were low performing managers, and women were less likely to experience a tradeoff than were men.
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Cites
Why Is There Mandatory Retirement?
Lazear, E. P. (1979) · Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1086/260835 · Cited by 2,038
Cited by
The Paradox of Meritocracy in Organizations
Castilla, E. J., & Benard, S. (2010) · Administrative Science Quarterly · doi:10.2189/asqu.2010.55.4.543 · Cited by 783
Paying More to Get Less: The Effects of External Hiring versus Internal Mobility
Bidwell, M. (2011) · Administrative Science Quarterly · doi:10.1177/0001839211433562 · Cited by 380
Time in Strategic Change Research
Kunisch, S., Bartunek, J. M., Mueller, J., & Huy, Q. N. (2017) · Academy of Management Annals · doi:10.5465/annals.2015.0133 · Cited by 294
Bidwell, M. J., Briscoe, F. S., Fernandez‐Mateo, I., & Sterling, A. D. (2013) · Academy of Management Annals · doi:10.1080/19416520.2013.761403 · Cited by 293
Gibson, C. B. (2017) · Organizational Research Methods · doi:10.1177/1094428116639133 · Cited by 262
Metadata
- Authors
- Dencker, J. C.
- Venue
- Administrative Science Quarterly
- Publisher
- SAGE Publications
- Published
- 2009-09
- Volume
- 54
- Issue
- 3
- Pages
- 453-485
- ISSN
- 0001-8392 (ISSN-L)
- 1930-3815
- OpenAlex
- W2049658687
- Cited by
- 59
- References
- 1
- FWCI
- 13.16
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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