Cited by 36Mobile Health and mHealth ApplicationsWeb Application Security VulnerabilitiesPrivacy, Security, and Data Protection

Client-Focused Security Assessment of mHealth Apps and Recommended Practices to Prevent or Mitigate Transport Security Issues

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Müthing, Jannis, Jäschke, Thomas, Friedrich, Christoph M·2017·JMIR mHealth and uHealth

Abstract

BACKGROUND: Mobile health (mHealth) apps show a growing importance for patients and health care professionals. Apps in this category are diverse. Some display important information (ie, drug interactions), whereas others help patients to keep track of their health. However, insufficient transport security can lead to confidentiality issues for patients and medical professionals, as well as safety issues regarding data integrity. mHealth apps should therefore deploy intensified vigilance to protect their data and integrity. This paper analyzes the state of security in mHealth apps. OBJECTIVE: The objectives of this study were as follows: (1) identification of relevant transport issues in mHealth apps, (2) development of a platform for test purposes, and (3) recommendation of practices to mitigate them. METHODS: Security characteristics relevant to the transport security of mHealth apps were assessed, presented, and discussed. These characteristics were used in the development of a prototypical platform facilitating streamlined tests of apps. For the tests, six lists of the 10 most downloaded free apps from three countries and two stores were selected. As some apps were part of these top 10 lists in more than one country, 53 unique apps were tested. RESULTS: Out of the 53 apps tested from three European App Stores for Android and iOS, 21/53 (40%) showed critical results. All 21 apps failed to guarantee the integrity of data displayed. A total of 18 apps leaked private data or were observable in a way that compromised confidentiality between apps and their servers; 17 apps used unprotected connections; and two apps failed to validate certificates correctly. None of the apps tested utilized certificate pinning. Many apps employed analytics or ad providers, undermining user privacy. CONCLUSIONS: The tests show that many mHealth apps do not apply sufficient transport security measures. The most common security issue was the use of any kind of unprotected connection. Some apps used secure connections only for selected tasks, leaving all other traffic vulnerable.

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Authors
Müthing, J., Jäschke, T., & Friedrich, C. M.
Affiliations
Dortmund University of Applied Sciences and Arts (DE)
Corresponding author
Friedrich, Christoph M
Venue
JMIR mHealth and uHealth
Published
2017-10-18
Volume
5
Issue
10
Pages
e147
ISSN
2291-5222 (ISSN-L)
OpenAlex
W2767017043
Cited by
36
References
2
Citations by year
2026: 1 · 2025: 3 · 2024: 3 · 2023: 3 · 2022: 6 · 2021: 6 · 2020: 4 · 2019: 4 · 2018: 6
FWCI
6.21
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
Licence
cc-by
Locations
  • JMIR mhealth and uhealth (publishedVersion, cc-by)
  • PubMed Central (publishedVersion, cc-by)
  • PubMed (publishedVersion)
  • DOAJ (DOAJ: Directory of Open Access Journals) (submittedVersion, cc-by-sa)
Topics
  • Health Sciences › Health Professions › General Health Professions › Mobile Health and mHealth Applications
  • Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Information Systems › Web Application Security Vulnerabilities
  • Social Sciences › Sociology and Political Science › Privacy, Security, and Data Protection
Keywords
mobile health apps, transport security, data integrity, confidentiality, certificate pinning, certificate validation, data leakage, user privacy, Android, iOS

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