Cited by 47Infrastructure Resilience and Vulnerability AnalysisInformation and Cyber SecurityCybersecurity and Cyber Warfare Studies

Risks of Terrorism to Information Technology and to Critical Interdependent Infrastructures

Chittester, Clyde G., Haimes, Yacov Y.·2004·Journal of Homeland Security and Emergency Management

Abstract

Coupled with the improved economic efficiency that information technology (IT) has generated are the adverse national impacts. A markedly increased reliance on IT and on the Internet has increased the complexity of our information systems because of the added interconnectedness and interdependencies between and among the infrastructures. This reliance has reduced the operational buffer zone in most infrastructures because of the ever-increasing adherence to the “just-in-time” philosophy as a vehicle for cost reduction and efficient operation, and it has enhanced accessibility of would-be terrorists to our telecommunications, defense, banking and financial institutions, as well as to other critical infrastructures.When the operability of IT-based controls and equipment is affected by acts of terrorism, then the performance of critical interdependent infrastructures such as railroads, electric power grids, or oil and gas pipelines is profoundly affected. Such information technology includes supervisory control and data acquisition (SCADA) systems, the global positioning system (GPS), and satellites.A detailed discussion is presented on the SCADA system and its use by railways. Hierarchical holographic modeling (HHM) and control objectives for information and related technology (CobiT) are introduced and used to identify sources of risk to SCADA systems in the railroad sector. The vulnerabilities to terrorist attacks of IT, SCADA, GPS, and satellites are explored. The risk asses…

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Crossref · 10.2202/1547-7355.1075

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  • Human supervision, and complicated software architecture and development process are characteristics of SCADA systems which exacerbate the role of the human factor.

    “Human supervision, and complicated software architecture and development process are the char-acteristics of SCADA systems which exacerbate the role of the human factor (Chittester and Haimes, 2004).”

    From A review of cyber security risk assessment methods for SCADA systems (2016) · cites this paper as Chittester and Haimes, 2004

  • The human factor plays a momentous role in cyber security of SCADA systems.

    “The human factor plays a momentous role in cyber secu-rity of SCADA systems.”

    From A review of cyber security risk assessment methods for SCADA systems (2016) · cites this paper as Chittester and Haimes, 2004

  • In three proposals (Chittester and Haimes, 2004; Permann and Rohde, 2005; Yu et al., 2006) no discussion of a method evaluation was found.

    “In three proposals (Chittester and Haimes, 2004; Permann and Rohde, 2005; Yu et al., 2006) no discussion of a method evalu-ation was found.”

    From A review of cyber security risk assessment methods for SCADA systems (2016) · cites this paper as Chittester and Haimes, 2004

  • Among all methods examined only Chittester and Haimes (2004) is exclusively dedicated to the understanding of a SCADA system.

    “Among all methods examined only Chittester and Haimes (2004) is exclusively dedicated to the understanding of a SCADA system.”

    From A review of cyber security risk assessment methods for SCADA systems (2016) · cites this paper as Chittester and Haimes (2004)

  • The holographic model of a SCADA system presented in Chittester and Haimes (2004) addresses an extensive range of technical and non-technical subtopics relevant to various aspects of the system.

    “The holographic model of a SCADA system pre-sented in Chittester and Haimes (2004) addresses an extensive range of technical and non-technical subtopics relevant to various aspects of the system.”

    From A review of cyber security risk assessment methods for SCADA systems (2016) · cites this paper as Chittester and Haimes (2004)

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References 17 · Cited by 47

Authors
Chittester, C. G., & Haimes, Y. Y.
Affiliations
  • Software Engineering Institute (US)
  • University of Virginia (US)
Venue
Journal of Homeland Security and Emergency Management
Published
2004-10-26
Volume
1
Issue
4
ISSN
1547-7355 (ISSN-L)
OpenAlex
W2031955557
Cited by
47
References
17
Citations by year
2026: 1 · 2024: 3 · 2023: 1 · 2022: 1 · 2021: 4 · 2020: 2 · 2019: 5 · 2018: 2 · 2017: 2 · 2016: 2 · 2015: 3 · 2014: 1 · 2013: 4 · 2012: 4
FWCI
6.44
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
closed
Locations
Journal of Homeland Security and Emergency Management (publishedVersion)
Topics
  • Physical Sciences › Engineering › Civil and Structural Engineering › Infrastructure Resilience and Vulnerability Analysis
  • Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Information Systems › Information and Cyber Security
  • Social Sciences › Political Science and International Relations › Cybersecurity and Cyber Warfare Studies
Keywords
terrorism, critical infrastructure, cybersecurity, SCADA systems, railway systems, GPS, satellite systems, risk assessment, risk management, vulnerability (computer security), threats, COBIT, just-in-time production, infrastructure interdependencies, reliability and availability

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