The DOI matches its Crossref record; 1 of the 1 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Resources for Sale: Corruption, Democracy and the Natural Resource Curse
Open accessAbstract
A puzzling piece of empirical evidence suggests that resource-abundant countries tend to grow slower than their resource-poor counterparts. We attempt to explain this phenomenon by developing a lobbying game in which rent seeking firms interact with corrupt governments. The presence or absence of political competition, as well as the potential costs of political transitions, turn out to be key elements in generating the 'resource curse.' These variables define the degree of freedom that incumbent governments have in pursuing development policies that maximize surplus in the lobbying game, but put the economy off its optimal path.
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Cites
Tornell, A., & Lane, P. R. (1999) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/aer.89.1.22 · Cited by 1,448
Cited by
Natural Resources: Curse or Blessing?
Ploeg, F. V. D. (2011) · Journal of Economic Literature · doi:10.1257/jel.49.2.366 · Cited by 2,283
Natural resources, democracy and corruption
Bhattacharyya, S., & Hodler, R. (2010) · European Economic Review · doi:10.1016/j.euroecorev.2009.10.004 · Cited by 695
Cursed by Resources or Institutions?
Mehlum, H., Moene, K., & Torvik, R. (2006) · The World Economy · doi:10.1111/j.1467-9701.2006.00808.x · Cited by 516
Corruption in natural resource management: Implications for policy makers
Kolstad, I., & Søreide, T. (2009) · Resources Policy · doi:10.1016/j.resourpol.2009.05.001 · Cited by 361
Why do some resource-abundant countries succeed while others do not?
Torvik, R. (2009) · Oxford Review of Economic Policy · doi:10.1093/oxrep/grp015 · Cited by 324
Metadata
- Authors
- Bulte, E., & Damania, R.
- Venue
- The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy
- Publisher
- Walter de Gruyter GmbH
- Published
- 2008-02-13
- Volume
- 8
- Issue
- 1
- ISSN
- 1935-1682 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W2156844464
- Cited by
- 186
- References
- 1
- FWCI
- 24.07
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
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