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Evolutionary Games and Equilibrium Selection

Mezzetti, Claudio, Samuelson, Larry·1998·Southern Economic Journal

Abstract

Part 1 Introduction: game theory equilibrium evolutionary games evolution evolution and equilibrium the path ahead. Part 2 The evolution of models: evolutionarily stable strategies alternative notions of evolutionary stability synamic systems. Part 3 A model of evolution: the aspiration and imitation model time sample paths stationary distributions limits. Appendix: proofs. Part 4 The dynamics of sample paths: dynamics equilibrium strictly dominated strategies weakly dominated strategies. Appendix: proofs. Part 5 The ultimatum game: the ultimatum game an ultimatum minigame numerical calculations relevance to experimental data? leaving money on the table. Appendix: proofs. Part 6 Drift: introduction the model when can drift be ignored? when drift matters examples discussion. Part 7 Noise: the model limit distributions alternative best replies trembles. Appendix: proofs. Part 8 Backward and forward induction: introduction the model recurrent outcomes backward induction forward induction markets. appendix: proofs. Part 9 Strict Nash equilibria: a muddling model dynamics equilibrium selection risk dominance discussion.

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Metadata

Authors
Mezzetti, C., & Samuelson, L.
Venue
Southern Economic Journal
Publisher
JSTOR
Published
1998-04
Volume
64
Issue
4
Pages
1019
ISSN
0038-4038 (ISSN-L)
OpenAlex
W1546006912
Cited by
806
References
0
FWCI
126.38
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
closed

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CoChat. (2026). Citation check: Evolutionary Games and Equilibrium Selection. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.2307/1061220
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Mezzetti, C., & Samuelson, L. (1998). Evolutionary Games and Equilibrium Selection. Southern Economic Journal. https://doi.org/10.2307/1061220

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