CoChat

Reasoning from the Body: A Historical Perspective on Abortion Regulation and Questions of Equal Protection

Siegel, Reva · 1992 · Stanford Law Review
Cited by 128

The DOI matches its Crossref record.

Abstract

[T]HERE ARE SERIOUS constitutional concerns presented by abortion-restrictive regu­ lation that [Roe v. Wade] does not address. Restricting women's access to abortion im­ plicates constitutional values of equality as well as privacy.... A growing number of commentators have begun to address abortion regulation as an issue of sexual equal­ ity, l articulating concerns scarcely recognized in prevailing accounts of abortion as a right of privacy. Properly understood, constitutional limitations on antiabortion laws, like constitutional limitations on antimiscegenation laws, have moorings in both pri­ vacy and equal protection. There are, however, substantial impediments to analyzing abortion-restrictive reg­ ulation in an equal protection framework, which few proponents of claim have con­ fronted. The Court has yet to characterize laws governing pregnancy as sex-based state action for purposes of equal protection review;2 but, even if it did so, a deeper ju­ risprudential problem remains. The Court typically reasons about reproductive regu­ lation in physiological paradigms, as a form of state action that concerns physical facts of sex rather than social questions of gender. It has often observed that reality of reproductive differences between sexesjustifies their differential regulatory treat­ ment. This mode of reasoning about reproductive regulation obscures possibility that such regulation may be animated by constitutionally illicit judgments about women. Thus, while sex-based state action is generally scrutinized to ensure it is free of old notions of role typing or other vestiges of separate spheres tradition-such as assumption that women are child-rearers or assumption that the female [is] destined solely for home and rearing of family3-regulation which di­ rectly concerns women's role in reproduction has yet to receive similar scrutiny. Like any other form of sex-based state action, regulation directed at women's role in reproduction demands exacting scrutiny to ensure it does not reflect or enforce traditional gender role assumptions. Equal protection jurisprudence has repeatedly articulated principles that would support such an inquiry. But current doctrine lacks critical capacity to discern gender bias in reproductive regulation, a grasp of how

Overview

The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.

Free: it reads the open-access text and checks the first 5 claims that cite a source we can check. Create a free account to check every claim.

A few free checks a day · papers already verified open instantly · results are public

Integrity signals

Registry

Crossref · 10.2307/1228947

Cites

Statistics

Verification

Claims the paper makes

The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.

Free: it reads the open-access text and checks the first 5 claims that cite a source we can check. Create a free account to check every claim.

A few free checks a day · papers already verified open instantly · results are public

Self-check

Percentages, sums and reported differences re-computed from the paper’s own numbers.

The self-check needs the paper’s full text.

Metadata

Authors
Siegel, R.
Venue
Stanford Law Review
Publisher
JSTOR
Published
1992-01
Volume
44
Issue
2
Pages
261
ISSN
0038-9765 (ISSN-L)
OpenAlex
W77309768
Cited by
128
References
0
FWCI
1.77
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
closed

About these checks

Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.

Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.

Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.

What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›

Are you an author, or do you see a problem with this page? Request a review

Data sources

Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.

Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).

Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.